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INTRODUCTION
Coordination among nations over the taxation of international transactions rests on a network of some 2000 bilateral
double tax treaties. The double tax treaties are, in many ways,
the roots of the international system. That system, however, is
in upheaval in the face of globalization, technological advances,
abuse by treaty beneficiaries, and shifting political tides. Yet serious examination of the worthiness of tax treaties is largely confined to the albeit important question of whether tax treaties are
beneficial for developing countries. Surprisingly little to no consideration has been paid to whether developed countries should
continue to sign tax treaties with one another. In fact, little evidence or theory exists to support entrance into a tax treaty by
countries like the United States. And, in some cases, tax treaties
may be detrimental to their interests.
Although tax treaties may have, at one time, served salutary
purposes, modern circumstances call into question their necessity. In short, tax treaties do not fulfill their purported objectives. Instead of alleviating double taxation, a dubious goal in
and of itself for many reasons, the treaties are the means to
achieve double non-taxation. This is because the tax treaties allocate taxing jurisdiction to the country of the taxpayer’s residence, which often fails to impose a tax. Moreover, there is little
evidence substantiating the claim that the treaties increase foreign direct investment. This is especially the case for a country
like the United States, which does not benefit from the comity
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considerations that the treaty system imparts. Functions such
as information exchange may provide benefits but can be
achieved through standalone treaties that do not allocate taxing
jurisdiction.
Rather than meet their intended goals, tax treaties may inflict harm. Although recent scholarship laments the revenue
losses imposed by the treaty system on developing countries,1
even developed countries may lose revenue if they are net capital-importing. Although the United States was a capital exporter
at the dawn of the treaty age, its role has since shifted. In fact,
data that I have collected calls into question the widespread assumption that the United States gains revenues through the
treaty system. It is my hope that these findings shift the burden
onto treaty proponents to conduct formal revenue and economic
analyses of treaties to justify their continuation. It perhaps
seems surprising that these concerns have not been explored by
policymakers in the United States but, as this Article argues, is
less so when one considers the limited process and political economy dynamics to which such treaties are subject.2
Furthermore, the treaty system impedes fundamental reform of the international tax system. In the aftermath of recent
tax legislation, many commentators have judged policies based
on their compatibility with tax treaties.3 I argue that such criticism is misplaced; tax reform will continue to be in tension with
1. Kim Brooks & Richard Krever, The Troubling Role of Tax Treaties, in
51 SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: TAX DESIGN ISSUES WORLDWIDE 159,
159–62 (Geerten M.M. Michielse & Victor Thuronyi eds., 2015); see, e.g., John
F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (1999); Allison
D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A
Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 644 (2005); Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties
Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939, 941 (2000); Alex Easson, Do We Still
Need Tax Treaties?, 54 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 619, 619–20
(2000); Lee A. Sheppard, How Can Vulnerable Countries Cope with Tax Avoidance?, 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 410, 410 (2013); Richard J. Vann, International Aspects of Income Taxation, in 2 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 718, 720 (Victor
Thuronyi ed., 1998).
2. The process by which tax treaties are enacted stands in stark contrast
to trade agreements, which are subject to full consideration in the Senate and
House. See Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE
J. INT’L L. 1, 33 (2013) (“[Tax t]reaties are . . . approved without fanfare by only
part of Congress.”).
3. See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah & Bret Wells, The BEAT and Treaty Overrides: A Brief Response to Rosenbloom and Shaheen, 92 TAX NOTES INT’L 383,
383 (2018); H. David Rosenbloom & Fadi Shaheen, The BEAT and the Treaties,
92 TAX NOTES INT’L 53, 53 (2018).
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tax treaties precisely because the premise underlying the treaties has proven unworkable. Moreover, incremental change that
comes from the sovereign exercise of taxing power may spur a
more rational approach to international taxation. This bottomup rebuilding of the international tax regime is likely a necessary step on the way to true international tax reform. Although
there will be a temporary disruption to the international tax order, and one which will certainly pose transition costs, such adjustments are inevitable in the transition to the modern global
and digital economy.
One way to ease the transition would be to employ an ordered mechanism to discard or scale down those treaty provisions that do the most harm—the ones that allocate taxing jurisdiction. One possible method is to leverage the OECD’s new
multilateral instrument that is currently being used to add antiavoidance principles, new residency safeguards, and other provisions to existing treaties.4 Just as the new multilateral instrument can be used to supplement the tax treaties, it can also be
used to dismantle their most noxious aspects, while leaving the
more useful, or at least less harmful, provisions in place. It could
also be used to reduce unnecessary mismatches in tax systems,
coordinating definitions of income, residency, and source, all
without forsaking taxing rights. Rather than assessing unworkable notions of economic neutrality, the challenge for the international tax system going forward will be to attempt some degree of coordination while also giving credence to national
interests in setting revenue policy.5 This solution aims to thread
that needle.
The new OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Programme of Work (known in the industry as “BEPS 2.0”), the details of which were announced as this Article was in its late
stages of production, could be seen as support for this Article’s
thesis. Ambitious in scope, BEPS 2.0 addresses tax challenges of

4. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MULTILATERAL CONVENTION
TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION
AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2017) (suggesting improvements to tax treaties).
5. See, e.g., TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 7 (2018) (arguing that the new international tax
system must navigate between competition and cooperation); DANIEL N.
SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 1–4 (2014) (questioning usefulness of notions of worldwide efficiency); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory
Policy, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001) (same).
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the new economy by modifying taxing rights and nexus rules and
by proposing a global minimum tax and inbound base erosion
rules.6 BEPS 2.0 would require radical revisions to existing tax
treaties, in particular those provisions that I identify to be the
most harmful.7
In Part I, this Article traces the history of the international
tax and the bilateral tax treaty system up through the recent
2017 U.S. tax legislation. Part II explores the stated and unstated purposes of tax treaties, concluding that they ultimately
fall short from the perspective of the United States. Part III examines possible harmful effects of the treaty regime, including
revenue considerations, loss of autonomy over revenue policy,
the hindrance of tax reform, and tax avoidance. Part IV offers
process and political economy reasons for why U.S. treaty policy
seems so misaligned with the national interest. Part V looks at
ways in which the new multilateral instrument can be utilized
to shed the most harmful treaty provisions while retaining, and
perhaps creating, others.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX AND
TREATY SYSTEM
Before investigating whether the current tax treaty system
is effectuating its goals, it is useful to understand its roots. This
Part explores the history of the global international tax system,
beginning with the pre-tax treaty era. It then outlines the purposes and features of tax treaties. It concludes by discussing the
current domestic rules on international tax.

6. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PROGRAMME OF WORK TO
DEVELOP A CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE
DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY (2019) [hereinafter OECD, INCLUSIVE
FRAMEWORK], https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/programme-of-work-to-develop-a
-consensus-solution-to-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of
-the-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/65XR-JZK5] (suggesting myriad solutions to
tax challenges); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SECRETARIAT PROPOSAL FOR A “UNIFIED APPROACH” UNDER PILLAR ONE (2019), https://www
.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-secretariat-proposal-unified
-approach-pillar-one.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9G6-8Z57] (same); ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., GLOBAL ANTI-BASE EROSION PROPOSAL (“GLOBE”)—PILLAR TWO (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document
-global-anti-base-erosion-proposal-pillar-two.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RYW
-J67N] (same).
7. OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 6, at 22–23.
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A. THE ROOTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM
The primary predicament underlying international taxation
is whether income should be taxed by the country in which the
taxpayer resides (the residence country) or by the country where
the income is earned (the source country).8 International tax
rules endeavor to resolve this dilemma by deciding which country gets to tax the income.9
Deferring to either the source or residence country alleviates
double taxation; but the two approaches differ as to which country gets the revenue.10 Typically, creditor—or capital-exporting—countries will favor residence-based taxation while
debtor—or capital-importing—countries favor source-based taxation.11 For instance, assume that there are two countries,
France and Great Britain. A French business borrows money
from a bank in Great Britain, and the question becomes whether
France, as the source country where the business is located and
where the business income is generated, or Great Britain, as the
residence country of the bank getting the interest, gets to tax the
interest income. If a country is capital-exporting, like Great Britain in this example, it will prefer a residence-based approach because it will get the revenues. If a country is capital-importing,
like France, then a source-based approach yields it greater tax
dollars.
The traditional historical account of international taxation
emphasizes a 1923 report for the League of Nations by four economists (1923 Report), led by Edwin Seligman, an economist at
Columbia University.12 The 1923 Report rejected source-based
taxation as resting upon a fallacy of the “benefits” theory of taxation—an exchange of government services for taxes.13 Instead,
its drafters subscribed to the theory of taxation based on ability
to pay concerns, i.e., those with the most resources contribute
8. Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1033 (1997); see, e.g., Ke Chin
Wang, International Double Taxation of Income: Relief Through International
Agreement, 1921-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 73, 81–82 (1945).
9. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 8.
10. Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 717, 739–40.
11. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1033–34.
12. Report Presented by Professors Bivens, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee, League
of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73 F.19 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Report].
13. Id. at 18, 48.
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the most to revenues.14 Ability to pay supports taxation by the
residence country since it is that country that is able to ascertain
the worldwide income of its residents, not the country of source.15
Importantly, the four economists recognized that capital-importing nations would not fare as well under the residence-based approach and therefore recommended that such division of taxing
jurisdiction only made sense where countries had similar economies.16
Several years later in 1928, the League of Nations drafted
model bilateral income tax treaties for the relief of double taxation, which were influenced by the 1923 Report as well as other
precedents.17 The League of Nations treaty was generous to the
residence country, allocating investment income principally to
that country.18 Although the source country had taxing jurisdiction over business income, such jurisdiction was limited to instances where the enterprise had a permanent establishment.19
The League of Nations treaty rejected an earlier model
treaty, which would have utilized a methodology to split profits
between source and residence countries in accordance with criteria such as sales.20 In so doing, it catered to the mercantilist
countries, who wished to tax more income as countries of residence rather than allocate income to where economic activity occurred.21 The rationale for this framework was premised on the
“mercantilist belief that imperial countries were the source of

14. Id. at 18.
15. See Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income
of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 22 (1993).
16. 1923 Report, supra note 12, at 48–49.
17. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1078 (emphasizing the 1923 Report,
along with other sources such as the early U.S. international tax legislation and
the work of the International Chamber of Commerce, as influences on the
League of Nations treaty).
18. See Report Presented by the General Meeting of Governmental Experts
on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562.M.178.
1928.II.A., at 16–17 (1928).
19. Id. at 16.
20. Bret Wells & Cym H. Lowell, Income Tax Treaty Policy in the 21st Century: Residence v. Source, 5 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 6 (2013).
21. Id. at 34. As Wells & Lowell note, the discussion in the archives with
regard to the political realities was “amazingly frank.” Id. The framers of the
treaty all seemed to be aware that capital exporting nations were benefitting
from the choice at the expense of the colonized.
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capital and know-how while the colonies were passive suppliers
of goods or services with little value-added functionality.”22
The 1928 model treaty served as the backbone of the tax
treaty network, influencing the model income tax treaties of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the United Nations, and the United States. The international tax system evolved such that the default was sourcebased taxation with treaties as an elective, bilateral mechanism
for countries to shift to residence-based taxation.23 Even today,
the more than 3000 bilateral income tax treaties have a fundamental structure based on the League of Nations treaty.24 This
residence-based approach to taxation has since been embraced
by the United States Treasury Department numerous times25
and, more generally, through the United States’ adherence to the
double income tax treaty system.26
The world has obviously changed since the 1920s, with a
massive growth in international capital flows, the creation of the
global economy, and the rise of the multinational corporation.
All of these developments increase the stakes at issue but also
underscore that the foundations of the international tax system—the categories of source and residence—are inherently
malleable concepts. Multinational corporations can avoid taxa-

22. Id. at 10.
23. Rosenzweig, supra note 10, at 741–42.
24. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996). The UN Model
treaty gives more generous taxing rights to source countries, but it is fundamentally based on the OECD Model, and its influence has been limited. Sergio
André Rocha, International Fiscal Imperialism and the “Principle” of the Permanent Establishment, 64 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 1, 2 (2014).
25. DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS
FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 89–90 (2d ed., rev. 1984); Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 226, Nov. 22,
1996, at 16; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S TAX
PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY (1985)
(proposing residence-based taxation).
26. To be sure, the origins of the international tax system are not neat and
tidy. The foreign tax credit rules of the early international tax system, for instance, were swayed by a key Treasury advisor, T.S. Adams, who argued for the
primacy of source-based rather than residence-based taxation. Graetz &
O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1027. Although residence-based taxation has reigned
supreme since the dawn of the tax treaty system, this is more of a departure
from, rather than a continuation of, the original international tax rules of the
United States. Id. at 1027–28.
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tion by shifting capital income and IP to tax havens and by arbitraging differences in tax systems. The transfer pricing regime
that attempts to stop profit shifting is premised on a legal fiction,
dividing an economic firm into legal units from various countries, that thus far has proven unenforceable.27 Finally, competition for investment and capital has created aggressive tax competition, leaving many nations starved for revenue.28
It thus is worth examining whether the approach to international tax embodied in the treaty system continues to be relevant. For decades, the international tax system was praised as
“remarkably stable and successful,”29 but few would conclude
that this continues to be the case.
B. PURPOSES AND FEATURES OF TAX TREATIES
Tax treaties have stated and unstated purposes. First and
foremost among the former, tax treaties are designed to eliminate double taxation.30 Double taxation occurs when more than
one country lays claim to taxing an item of income.31 Tax treaties
attempt to deal with double taxation by either (1) limiting source
country taxation on investment income or business income that
27. Patricia Gimbel Lewis, What You Really Need To Know About Transfer
Pricing, CORP. COUNS. BUS. J. (June 25, 2012), https://ccbjournal.com/articles/
what-you-really-need-know-about-transfer-pricing [https://perma.cc/PF94
-92TH] (“The proliferation of transfer pricing rules and their enforcement
around the world threatens to strangle our tax system and that of other countries in trying to administer these rules.”).
28. Michael J. Graetz, Foreword—The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Politics Produced Precarious Policy, 128 YALE L.J.F. 315, 328 (2018).
29. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1026; see also Jones, supra note 1,
at 2.
30. Almost all tax treaties emphasize their purpose of avoiding double taxation by stating in the recital of the treaty the following: “Convention Between
the United States of America and ___ for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income.” Philip F.
Postlewaite & David S. Makarski, The A.L.I. Tax Treaty Study—A Critique and
a Modest Proposal, 52 TAX L. 731, 734 n.2 (1999). The OECD Model Convention
makes no explicit mention of avoiding double taxation, but did so until 1977.
MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL I-7 (ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 2017) [hereinafter OECD MODEL TREATY]. The preamble to
the treaty was changed not to reject that purpose but to account for the fact that
the treaty also addressed other concerns as well. Id.; Mitchell A. Kane, International Tax Reform, the Tragedy of the Commons, and Bilateral Tax Treaties 42
(May 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
31. Marius Eugene Radu, International Double Taxation, 62 PROCEDIA
SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 403, 403 (2012).
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lacks a significant and continuous presence in the source country
(the permanent establishment requirement), (2) requiring the
residence country to provide an exemption of foreign source income or a tax credit for foreign taxes paid, or (3) coordinating the
rules of both countries.32 Tax treaties further establish competent authority procedures, and, more recently, binding arbitration, such that tax authorities commit to resolving issues of double taxation.33 Tax treaties also endeavor to refine definitions of
residency to reduce instances of double taxation.34
Another stated goal of tax treaties is to limit fiscal evasion.
Treaties attempt to achieve this through information sharing
provisions, which require tax authorities to disclose information
to one another regarding taxpayers residing in one country who
have tax obligations in the other country.35 These provisions typically override domestic confidentiality laws that bar governments from releasing tax information.36 This enables the residence country to more readily identify foreign source income of
its residents.
In recent years, tax treaties have been critiqued for focusing
solely on double taxation rather than double non-taxation, which
has plagued the international tax system in recent decades.37 In
response to these concerns, there are efforts to revise the stated
purposes of treaties. As a result of the OECD/G20’s project

32. Rosenzweig, supra note 10, at 729, 739–40; see, e.g., UNITED STATES
MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 23 (U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2016)
[hereinafter U.S. MODEL TREATY] (“[D]ouble taxation will be relieved as follows . . . In accordance with the provisions and subject to the limitations of the
law of the United States (as it may be amended from time to time without changing the general principle hereof), the United States shall allow to a resident or
citizen of the United States as a credit against the United States tax on income
applicable to residents and citizens: . . . the income tax paid or accrued to [the
other treaty country] by or on behalf of such resident or citizen . . . .”).
33. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 25.
34. See, e.g., id. art. 4.
35. See, e.g., id. art. 26 (requiring the competent authorities of each treaty
party to share information that would assist in carrying out the treaty provisions or domestic tax laws).
36. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., KEEPING IT SAFE: THE
OECD GUIDE ON THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION EXCHANGED FOR TAX PURPOSES 11 (2012).
37. This dynamic partially stems from tax competition, which distorts the
allocation of capital and results in revenue losses worldwide. Reuven S. AviYonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576–78 (2000).
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against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS project), a multilateral instrument has been developed to update existing tax
treaties to conform to treaty-related minimum standards and to
close gaps with existing rules. The multilateral instrument allows countries to choose among various off-the-shelf updates to
existing tax treaties.38 Through a novel matching process, if a
country’s partners in existing tax treaties also choose a particular change, the treaty is automatically updated subject to domestic ratification procedures.39
The new instrument provides an option whereby treaty
countries can adopt a preamble that commits to the elimination
of double taxation “without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance.”40 It
implements this language through rules such as minimum
standards limiting treaty shopping, a new anti-abuse standard,
and rules against hybrid mismatches.41 The United States
Treasury indicated that the United States did not sign the instrument, in part, because U.S. domestic tax provisions, as well
as its negotiating position for a number of years, already limit
treaty shopping and abuse.42 Sixty-eight countries and jurisdictions have, however, signed on to the effort.43
38. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 4 (providing options a party may apply to its tax treaties).
39. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT MATCHING DATABASE, https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/MLI-database
-disclaimer-and-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/36GF-RQAU].
40. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 4, art. 6, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). The multilateral instrument further provides that the participating countries can amend their treaties preamble to include a desire “to develop an economic relationship” between the treaty countries or “to enhance
their co-operation in tax matters.” Id. art. 6, ¶ 3.
41. Id. art. 7.
42. See Jessica Silbering-Meyer, 68 Sign the Multilateral Instrument, REUTERS: ANSWERS FOR TAX PROF. (Oct. 25, 2017), https://blogs.thomsonreuters
.com/answerson/68-sign-the-multilateral-instrument-mli/ [https://perma.cc/
84RF-XDZA]. Treaty shopping provisions are aimed at reducing the ability of
residents of non-treaty party jurisdictions to obtain benefits of the treaties. ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 4, at 8. The new anti-abuse rule
is formulated as a general test whereby the “principal purpose” of transactions
have to be unrelated to obtaining treaty benefits. Id. at 23. The hybrid mismatch
rules aim to neutralize the ability for taxpayers to produce multiple deductions
for a single expense or to obtain a deduction in one jurisdiction with no offsetting
income inclusion in another jurisdiction. Id. at 84.
43. Five Things To Know About the OECD’s Multilateral Instrument, DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA) No. 116, June 16, 2017, at I1.
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Although the treaties themselves, as well as treaty commentaries, refer to the elimination of double taxation as their primary goal, some commentators have emphasized that modern
tax treaties have focused primarily on the reduction of withholding taxes.44 Although addressing double taxation necessarily
leads to a reduction in tax liability, the inverse is not true. Thus,
tax treaties may simply reduce tax rates without addressing
double taxation.45
The following chart summarizes the main features of tax
treaties and specifies the corresponding article of the treaties. In
Part V, I revisit this chart to discuss which articles of the treaties
should be maintained or should be unraveled. I refer to features
2 and 3, which together limit source country taxation over business and investment income, as the “jurisdictional provisions” of
tax treaties. These provisions are the primary subject of my critique.
Main Treaty Features

Article Number46

1.

Residency Rules/Limitation on
Benefits

Articles 4, 22

2.

Permanent Establishment
Requirement (Jurisdictional
Provision)

Articles 5, 7

3.

Limiting Source Country
Withholding Tax on Investment
Income (Jurisdictional
Provision)

Articles 10–13

4.

Alleviation of Double Tax
Requirements

Article 23

5.

Non-Discrimination Provisions

Article 24

6.

Transfer Pricing/Dispute
Resolution

Article 25

7.

Information Exchange
Provisions

Article 26

44. See, e.g., Patrick Driessen, Is There a Tax Treaty Insularity Complex?,
135 TAX NOTES 745, 748 (2012).
45. Id.
46. The Articles in the chart refer to U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32.
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C. THE DOMESTIC RULES ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
1. Worldwide v. Territorial
Tax treaties lack operative provisions of law. Instead, they
mostly function as jurisdictional overlays to the domestic rules
of taxation, restricting a state’s claim to tax a certain item of income.47 Tax treaties limit the domestic rules by allocating the
right to tax income to one treaty country or by requiring relief
from double taxation.48 Importantly, a tax treaty does not create
tax obligations, which are created by the operative domestic
law.49 Additionally, under the “savings” clause of the treaties,
the residence countries retain the right to tax worldwide income.50 Thus, the curtailment of source country jurisdiction only
applies to foreign nationals, not to a resident of the contracting
state.
The domestic rules of international tax are as varied as the
number of countries that employ them, but a few generalizations
can be made. Commentators refer to two different types of international tax systems: worldwide and territorial.51 A worldwide
system of taxation subjects foreign earnings to taxation, typically with relief of double taxation through a foreign tax credit.52
A territorial system of taxation exempts such earnings altogether.53
The majority of developed countries have shifted, in recent
decades, towards territoriality.54 In reality, however, the distinction between territorial systems and worldwide systems is
blurred, and the systems exist along a continuum.55 Developed

47. Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting Tax Treaties, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1387,
1411 (2016).
48. For instance, Article 12 of the U.S. Model Treaty provides only the country of residence can tax royalty income. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art.
12. Article 23 requires the provision of tax credits to alleviate double taxation.
Id. art. 23.
49. See Kysar, supra note 47, at 1411.
50. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24, ¶ 4.
51. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Expanded Worldwide Versus Territorial Taxation After the TCJA, 161 TAX NOTES 1173, 1173 (2018).
52. Id. at 1174.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., id. at 1175.
55. See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R44013, CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS):
AN EXAMINATION OF THE DATA 17–18 (2015) (discussing the futility of the
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countries with territorial systems, for instance, have anti-profit
shifting rules that tax certain types of highly mobile foreign income, which are presumed to be located offshore simply for tax
reasons.56 These foreign systems could thus be more properly described as quasi-territorial. The United States’ international tax
system, both new and old, also lies on a spectrum, as discussed
below.
2. The U.S. Rules—Pre- and Post-2017
Experts often referred to the former U.S. international tax
system as worldwide since it subjected foreign earnings to U.S.
taxation.57 However, the former system never fully taxed these
earnings. Taxation could be deferred, even indefinitely, by parking active income in foreign subsidiaries.58 In contrast, taxation
could not be deferred on passive income, which was, and still is,
taxed on a current basis under the anti-deferral rules of subpart
F and the passive foreign investment company regime.59 Additionally, the transfer pricing regime attempted to prevent companies from shifting too much income abroad to their foreign affiliates by charging non-arm’s length prices. These rules are
notoriously ineffective, yet they continue to be relevant under
the new system.
Since the taxation of foreign source income by the United
States might subject such income to double taxation, the United
States has long offered a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid

worldwide and territorial labels); Daniel N. Shaviro, The New Non-Territorial
U.S. International Tax System, 160 TAX NOTES 57, 57 (2018).
56. Such rules commonly take the form of controlled foreign corporation
(CFC) rules, which provide for current inclusion of income from closely held corporations. Although historically the province of worldwide tax systems, in 1980,
France adopted CFC rules to combat abuses of its territorial system. Sebastian
Dueñas, CFC Rules Around the World, TAX FOUND. 5 (June 2019), https://files
.taxfoundation.org/20190617100144/CFC-Rules-Around-the-World-FF-659.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VC9-4TG3].
57. Territorial vs. Worldwide Taxation, SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM.
(Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/territorial-vs
-worldwide-taxation [https://perma.cc/U7XN-D6LW].
58. See U.S. Tax Reform: A Guide to Income Tax Accounting Considerations, ERNST & YOUNG: GLOBAL TAX ALERT 7 (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.ey
.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/US_tax_reform_-_A_guide_to_income_tax_
accounting_considerations/$FILE/2017G_07168-171Gbl_US%20tax%20
reform%20A%20guide%20to%20income%20tax%20accounting%20
considerations.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD5L-78D8].
59. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 951, 1291 (2018).
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on such income. The credit was first enacted in 1918,60 long before the United States’ entrance into its first tax treaty in 1932.61
The effect of the credit is such that the United States collects
residual taxation when its tax rate exceeds the foreign rate.62
When the foreign rate equals or exceeds the U.S. rate, U.S. tax
liability is eliminated.63
The new regime has been labeled a territorial system because the foreign income of foreign subsidiaries can escape taxation altogether through the new participation exemption provision.64 Here again, however, the territorial label fails since
individuals, branches, and smaller shareholders are still subject
to taxation on foreign income. Furthermore, there is a minimum
tax regime, called the global intangible low tax income, or
“GILTI” regime, which subjects some foreign income of 10% corporate shareholders to a current 10.5% tax (and allows a foreign
tax credit offset for 80% of foreign taxes paid).65 Lawmakers created these worldwide features since a move to pure exemption,
as opposed to deferral, would have worsened incentives to shift
income abroad.
In addition to the participation exemption and minimum tax
regimes, the 2017 tax legislation also enacted two other notable
reforms. In the foreign derived intangible income, or “FDII” regime, Congress provided a special low rate on export income.66
Through the base erosion anti-abuse tax, or “BEAT” regime, the
legislation also bolstered source-based taxation by targeting
profit stripping by U.S. firms making deductible payments to foreign affiliates.67 The BEAT subjects such payments to a minimum tax of 10%.68 Features of these new rules are in arguable
tension with bilateral tax treaties,69 a point which will be treated
more fully below.
60. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
61. See Herbert I. Lazerow, The United States-French Income Tax Convention, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 649 n.1 (1971).
62. Elisabeth A. Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in
Relieving Double Taxation, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 432 (1963).
63. Id.
64. This is the case so long as the domestic shareholder owns at least 10%
of the stock of the subsidiary. 26 U.S.C. § 245A (2018).
65. Id. §§ 250(a)(1), 951A, 960.
66. Id. § 250.
67. Id. § 59A.
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
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II. DISCARDING PURPORTED PURPOSES OF TAX
TREATIES
As mentioned above, there are both stated and unstated
purposes of tax treaties.70 The treaties themselves set forth double taxation relief and the prevention of fiscal evasion as their
aims, yet commentators have hypothesized other motivations behind the treaties as well. Part II explores how all of these goals
go largely unfilled.
A. ALLEVIATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION
1. Availability of Unilateral Relief
The need to alleviate double taxation served as the impetus
for the tax treaty regime.71 The conventional account is that,
without tax treaties, multiple countries will lay claim to the
same item of income.72 The predominant explanation for why we
care about double taxation is that it “represents an unfair burden on existing investment and an arbitrary barrier to the free
flow of international capital, goods, and persons.”73
Tsilly Dagan has illustrated, however, that even without tax
treaties, countries have incentives and mechanisms to alleviate
double taxation unilaterally.74 Instead, Dagan argues that tax
treaties serve “much less heroic goals,” such as easing administrative burdens and harmonizing tax terminology.75 More nefariously, Dagan contends tax treaties shift revenues from developing to developed countries.76 The IMF has agreed with Dagan’s

70. See supra Part I.
71. See supra Part I.B.
72. Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the
United States and Canada: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
105th Cong. 4 (1997) (“The traditional objectives of U.S. tax treaties have been
the avoidance of international double taxation and the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion.”); OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 30, at I-5 (“[A] main objective of tax treaties is the avoidance of double taxation in order to reduce tax
obstacles to cross-border services, trade and investment . . . .”).
73. H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty
Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 365–66 (1981).
74. Dagan, supra note 1, at 941.
75. Id. at 939.
76. Id.
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view, noting that tax treaties based on the OECD model “significantly constrain the source country’s rights” and cautions
against developing countries entering into such treaties.77
Dagan concludes tax treaties involve something other than
elimination of double taxation.78 U.S. and global history lends
support to Dagan’s conclusion. The United States enacted the
foreign tax credit almost fifteen years before entering into tax
treaties.79 And the credit applies to residents of non-treaty and
treaty countries alike. Today, most countries include in their tax

77. INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF POLICY PAPER: SPILLOVERS IN INTERNACORPORATE TAXATION 12 (2014), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/
eng/2014/050914.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AHY-44VB]; see also Mindy Herzfeld,
The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for Tax Coordination, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 16–
17 (2017). Predating Dagan’s analysis by several decades were comments by
Elisabeth Owens who, focusing on the United States, argued that “tax treaties
play a very marginal role in relieving double taxation” because “the U.S. has
unilaterally provided for the avoidance of double taxation . . . through the foreign tax credit provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.” Owens, supra note 62,
at 430. More recently, commentators have reflected on the diminished role of
tax treaties but without much elaboration or normative assessment. Dagan, supra note 1, at 945 (making this point); see, e.g., JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND FOREIGN INCOME
55:2 (2d ed. 2000) (“Tax treaties are principally concerned with the apportionment of tax revenues between the treasuries of the treaty countries.”); see also
PAUL R. MCDANIEL & HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 151 (1977) (concluding that double taxation is eliminated
through unilateral measures and that tax treaties serve a more modest function
of refining these measures to reflect the relationships of the two treaty countries); Pierre Gravelle, Tax Treaties: Concepts, Objectives and Types, 42 BULL.
FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 522, 523 (1988) (adopting the view that tax
treaties merely “refine[] and improve[]” the domestic mechanisms to alleviate
double taxation); Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with
Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1766–67 (1995) (arguing that unilateral measures to reduce double taxation has lessened the need for taxpayers
to rely on treaty provisions). The ALI, in contrast, has concluded that “[t]here is
remarkably broad and well-established consensus among governments of various political and economic persuasions that it is in their interest to enter into
income tax treaties.” AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II, PROPOSALS ON
UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 5 (1992). Even the ALI, however, also
admitted that many treaty goals can be achieved through domestic legislation,
outside of the treaty process. Instead, countries modify their domestic laws only
to derive reciprocal dispensations from the other country. Id. at 12–13.
78. Dagan, supra note 1, at 982–88.
79. See Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New
Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 944 (2007).
TIONAL
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treaties the same mechanism for double tax relief that they provide outside of the tax treaty context.80
2. Double Taxation Relief Through Harmonization?
The unilateral domestic relief of double taxation through
foreign tax credits, deductions, or exemption is not fail-safe.
Gaps exist such that double taxation results even in the face of
such mechanisms. Do treaties then step in to resolve such matters? If a country taxes domestic source income, then one function of a tax treaty might be to ensure that what constitutes domestic (as opposed to foreign) source income is understood by all
parties.81 In fact, treaties serve no such purposes, instead leaving the definition of source to the domestic rules. Although some
treaties contain re-sourcing rules that treat an item of income as
foreign source if a treaty partner is permitted to tax it, these
rules are not always comprehensive.82 This amounts to a significant amount of double taxation that is left to be resolved
through the treaty’s administrative solutions, such as the mutual agreement procedure and, increasingly, binding arbitration.83 Although such dispute resolution procedures might be important, they need not be accompanied by the shifting of tax
jurisdiction between countries and could instead be set forth as
standalone agreements.84

80. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 7.
81. Owens, supra note 62, at 430.
82. The U.S. Model Treaty currently has a general re-sourcing rule that is
fairly comprehensive. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 23(3). It is
intended to ensure that a U.S. resident can obtain a foreign tax credit when a
treaty partner taxes the item of income in question. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, at 74 (2006), https://www
.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16802.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4JKZ-RKLZ]. Many treaties in force, however, have far less comprehensive re-sourcing rules. See TAX SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT NO.
1313, REPORT ON TREATY RE-SOURCING RULES 26–27 (2014), https://www
.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2014/Tax_Section_
Report_1313.html [https://perma.cc/HQU8-525R] (identifying treaties that either do not have general re-sourcing language or impose limits on the general
re-sourcing rules).
83. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 25 (describing the mutual
agreement procedures for resolving disagreements that arise under the treaty).
84. Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 166.
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Treaties also do not resolve conflicts of characterization,
again leaving a significant amount of double taxation in place.85
This is because the treaties defer to the domestic rules to assign
character of income. For instance, suppose the residence country
characterizes income as royalties, thereby concluding that such
income is exempt from source country taxation under the treaty
and is taxable by the residence country. Further suppose the
source country characterizes the income as compensation from
personal services, in which case it is rightly subject to taxation
by the source country under the treaty. This produces a conflict,
which the treaties do not resolve.86
Double taxation may also occur because the treaties do not
contain a uniform and ascertainable definition of “covered
taxes,” or the taxes for which the treaty country must provide
relief from double taxation. In the U.S. Model Treaty, for instance, Article 2 states that the treaty applies to “Federal income
taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Code” and also covers
“identical or substantially similar taxes that are imposed after
the date of [the signing of the treaty] in addition to, or in place
of, the existing taxes.”87 The term “covered taxes” is notoriously
difficult to interpret and, in recent years, has become the subject
of intense debate.88
85. Id. at 168.
86. See Boulez v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 584, 589 (1984) (holding that payments
to a music conductor were compensation for services—a category that did not
get benefits under the relevant treaty—rather than royalties, which would have
been tax-free under the treaty). The U.S. Model Treaty provides that if a term
is not defined by the treaty, then the country that is applying the treaty should
use its tax law to supply the term’s meaning, “unless the context otherwise requires.” U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 3(2). One interpretation of Article 3(2) is that only the source state can invoke it since it is the one typically
applying the treaty. Avery Jones, supra note 1, at 18. The residence state, however, could take the position that it should apply its domestic laws in interpreting whether it must give relief for double taxation. Id. In such cases, double
taxation might ensue. Id.
87. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 2.
88. See Fadi Shaheen, Income Tax Treaty Aspects of Nonincome Taxes: The
Importance of Residence, 71 TAX L. REV. 583, 607, 609–10, 612–14 (2018); Richard S. Collier & Michael P. Devereux, The Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax
and Double Tax Treaties 7 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation, Working Paper
No. 17/06, 2017), https://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/6808/1/WP1706.pdf [https://perma
.cc/DU37-CSMC]. Most recently, whether the new BEAT, enacted in the 2017
U.S. tax legislation, falls within the scope of Article 2 has become an area of live
concern given that regime’s only partial creditability of foreign tax credits. See
infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
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Avoidance of double taxation is also often not achieved because transactions involve jurisdictions beyond those mentioned
in the tax treaties.89 Moreover, treaties address only “juridical
rather than economic double taxation,” thereby allowing some
double taxation to occur.90
Tax treaties could resolve many of the above such matters,
but the treaty language is often very general and its structure
interstitial. This lack of specificity and comprehensiveness is
most certainly a conscious choice by the treaty parties, who are
reluctant to grant double tax relief in close cases. For the most
part, these are precisely the cases not granted relief under domestic law, and so one is left to wonder what tax treaties accomplish that is not already achieved under the domestic law.
3. Double Taxation as Red Herring
Even if tax treaties were necessary to avoid double taxation,
it is unclear whether that goal should be pursued. To achieve
double taxation relief would require more complete coordination,
which may be undesirable given the centrality of taxation to the
governmental function. As Daniel Shaviro has argued outside of
the treaty context, nations may be reluctant to forfeit their independence in this area.91 Additionally, defining source “correctly”
is, in many contexts, a fool’s errand: economically speaking, multiple and overlapping jurisdictions generate income.92 Finally,
Shaviro argues that the principle of taxing all income once will

89. See EMILY FETT, TRIANGULAR CASES: THE APPLICATION OF BILATERAL
INCOME TAX TREATIES IN MULTILATERAL SITUATIONS 20 (2014); Ruth Mason,
U.S. Tax Treaty Policy and the European Court of Justice, 59 TAX L. REV. 65,
113–14 (2005).
90. Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 973, 986 (2016); see also Wei Cui, Minimalism About Residence and Source,
38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 245, 266–67 (2017) (arguing that the focus on double taxation overlooks the economic incidence of taxes). Juridical double taxation is
when the same taxpayer has to pay tax twice on the same income. FETT, supra
note 89, at 60. Economic double taxation occurs when different taxpayers have
to pay tax twice on the same income. Id.
91. SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 113.
92. Id.; see also Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International
Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 30 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990) (contending that “source” lacks economic foundation). But see Mitchell A. Kane, A
Defense of Source Rules in International Taxation, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 311, 323
(2015) (defending the coherence of source rules although not necessarily on economic grounds).
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likely not enhance global efficiency.93 This is because countries
vary in their tax rates; therefore, taxing income once, and only
once, does not yield any locational neutrality in investment decisions.94 Instead, taxpayers will decide where to conduct activity based on where the lowest tax rate can be obtained.95 In the
real world, because of differences in tax regimes, double taxation
of income may even increase global efficiency, if, for instance,
this would create neutrality between a taxpayer facing a 40%
rate in Country A versus a 20% rate in Country B.96
Shaviro, however, goes on to conclude that the avoidance of
double taxation may nonetheless be a worthy goal of bilateral
tax treaties if the treaty countries have the same tax rates and
equal cross-border capital flows.97 In that situation, the avoidance of double taxation creates economic surplus by establishing
neutrality between single-country and cross-country income.98
Because the countries are similarly situated, the concessions
made by Country A in the above example in forgoing taxation of
Country B’s residents are balanced by Country B’s similar concessions regarding its own residents.99
In reality, however, it is extremely unlikely that the two
countries will be identically situated, both in tax rates and investment flows.100 This is especially true over time.101 Moreover,
even if such homogeneity exists, the existence of tax havens creates imbalance between the two countries since it is likely that
one country’s rules allow for more or less income-shifting to such
havens.102 It is thus unclear what goal the avoidance of double
taxation is serving, even in the treaty context. Indeed, the heterogeneity of treaty countries may explain the above observa-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
See Elke Asen, Corporate Tax Rates Around the World, 2019, TAX
FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/publications/corporate-tax
-rates-around-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/QQ6N-HBFM] (examining global tax
rate data).
101. See id. (discussing global tax rate changes since 1980).
102. SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 115–16.
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tion—that treaties do not in fact ameliorate double taxation. Doing so would serve no efficiency goal nor would it be of equal desirability to each country.
Another recent debate in the academic literature exposes
what little work the concept of double taxation accomplishes in
the treaty network. Recent proposals to reform the U.S. international tax system deviate from the model of full creditability of
foreign taxes under a worldwide system.103 Shaviro, for instance,
has proposed a reduced rate for foreign source business income
and the allowance of a deduction, rather than a credit, for foreign
taxes paid.104 Part of Shaviro’s rationale stems from the conclusion that the foreign tax credit’s 100% marginal reimbursement
rate (MRR) problematically makes taxpayers insensitive to foreign tax rates.105 This insensitivity is against the national interest because the U.S. government ends up footing the bill for
higher taxes abroad. Shaviro’s approach is similar to other proposals, such as Option Z and that of the former Obama administration.106 It also has been partially implemented in the 2017
legislation through the GILTI regime, which allows foreign tax
credits of only 80%.107
It is an open issue whether these proposals or the GILTI regime comply with Article 23 of the treaties, but there is a persuasive argument that incarnations of them do.108 Historically,
the foreign tax credit has reduced tax liability dollar for dollar.109
Fadi Shaheen argues, however, that it is acceptable to divide a

103. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Foreign Tax Creditability, 63
NAT’L TAX J. 709, 710 (2010) (arguing for deductibility of foreign source income
rather than full creditability); see also Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 570 (2003) (reaching
similar conclusions for foreign taxes on passive income).
104. Shaviro, supra note 103.
105. Id.
106. Shaviro himself notes these similarities. See Daniel Shaviro, Response
to Comments on Fixing U.S. International Taxation, 9 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL
STUD. 132, 140–41 (2014) [hereinafter Shaviro, Response]; Daniel Shaviro, The
Crossroads Versus the Seesaw: Getting a “Fix” on Recent International Tax Policy Developments, 69 TAX L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2015) [hereinafter Shaviro, Crossroads].
107. 26 U.S.C. § 960(d)(1) (2018).
108. Article 23 requires either exemption or a credit for foreign taxes. U.S.
MODEL TREATY supra note 32, art. 23.
109. Shaviro, Response, supra note 106, at 709.
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dollar of foreign source income and allow credits on only a portion of the dollar so long as the other portion is exempted.110 Option Z would have followed this approach explicitly, providing
that foreign source income was 60% taxable with foreign tax
credits and 40% exempt.111 Shaheen’s argument is that, under
both the U.S. and OECD model treaties, these types of proposals
are treaty-compliant so long as the exempt piece and the creditable piece of the income add up to at least 100%.112 GILTI is a
variation of this approach, albeit more generous, since it is taxing only 50% of foreign source income while allowing foreign tax
credits for 80% of foreign taxes paid.113
Mitchell Kane agrees with Shaheen’s general conclusion
that, so long as the income can be separated into exempt and
creditable portions, a mixture of these two approaches is treatycompliant.114 Kane goes further to add that treaties prevent the
resident country from causing its residents’ foreign source income to be taxed at a higher rate than domestic source income
(taking into account both countries’ taxes).115 This means that if
the source country imposes a higher tax than the residence country, then the residence country cannot impose any residencebased tax. If the source country taxes at a lower rate, then the
residence country can tax the shortfall, but only up to its rate on
domestic source income.
Drawing upon League of Nations documents, Kane argues
that double taxation does not really mean double taxation.116 Instead, in the treaty sense, the relevant inquiry is simply whether
the overall tax burden exceeds what would have been imposed
by the residence country on domestic source income.117 Tax treaties, in other words, are about capping rates rather than double
taxation per se. In pursuing this goal, they strive towards a particular result rather than a particular method.118
110. Fadi Shaheen, How Reform-Friendly Are U.S. Tax Treaties?, 41 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 1243, 1269–70 (2016).
111. Id. at 1278.
112. Id. at 1278–79.
113. JANE G. GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R45186, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION: THE 2017 REVISION
(P.L. 115-97), at 4 (2019).
114. Kane, supra note 30, at 28–29.
115. Id. at 41.
116. Id. at 47.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Under this framework, what obligation to credit foreign
taxes does the residence country have when it imposes a lower
rate on foreign source income than it does on domestic source
income? Kane admits this is a question that the treaty drafters
did not specifically contemplate, but using the above framework,
this set of facts should reduce the burden of juridical double taxation and the corresponding obligation arising under Article
23.119 In such cases, Kane reasons that a partial credit, rather
than a dollar for dollar credit, will satisfy Article 23 so long as
the overall tax burden does not exceed that imposed on domestic
source income.120
Both Kane’s and Shaheen’s analysis seem to suggest that
Article 23’s central concern is aggregate tax burden rather than
the method of double tax relief, albeit Kane’s conclusion is more
explicit in this regard. If double taxation seems like a normatively empty goal, does aggregate tax burden fare any better? It
would seem, after all, that investors care about the overall level
of tax they are paying rather than whether income is technically
taxed once, twice, or multiple times. Double taxation could lead
to better tax results than single taxation, if, for instance, two
countries imposed a 10% tax and a single country imposed a 30%
tax on an item of income.
It seems rational, then, that countries should care more
about overall taxation rather than double taxation. It also seems
in the countries’ interest to preserve a mixture of double tax relief methods, as Kane concludes.121 From the perspective of the
residence country, worldwide taxation with full foreign tax credit
relief cuts off tax competition since the source country cannot set
the tax burden on the foreign source income.122 In contrast, under an exemption system, the source country can do so.123 But
the former system also makes its investors insensitive to local
tax rates and may overly burden its residents. From the perspective of the source country, it may prefer residence country exemption since it gets to set the tax rates, however, the source
country may also enjoy the ability to increase revenues without

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 54.
Id.
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the foreign resident facing an increased tax burden, as is possible under the credit system.124
In Kane’s view, both residence and source countries would
prefer a treaty that preserves policy mixture so that they can
balance these various and competing goals, rather than a system
that forces them into pure credit or pure exemption approaches.125 And, under Kane’s view, the former system is indeed
what we have.126 Kane is likely right that a hybrid approach to
international taxation makes the most sense strategically and
indeed is reflected in the treaties and nearly all international tax
systems. But a further question arises as to whether the treaty
is doing any work here.
If it is in the unilateral interest of both nations to have a
mixed system, then that is likely what will arise without tax
treaties. Indeed, the flexibility of the treaties, as interpreted by
Kane and Shaheen, means that neither nation has settled upon
which degree of rate competition versus revenue collection they
would prefer, instead leaving it up to the domestic policies of the
residence country. The source country, in other words, remains
beholden to the policy choices of the treaty partner.
One concession that the source country does obtain, at least
under Kane’s view, is that overall taxation will be capped at the
residence country’s tax rate on domestic source income.127
Query, however, whether this is any sort of meaningful promise.
Overall taxation still depends on the domestic rates of the residence country; nothing in the treaty prevents very high taxation
so long as the residence country also imposes such rates on domestic source income. There are political and practical constraints, however, on the ability of the residence country to tax
foreign source income more heavily than domestic source income.
In fact, it is generally the opposite that we worry about—
that foreign source income goes undertaxed by the residence
country. This outcome results because there are convincing reasons a residence country would prefer to more lightly tax foreign
source income than domestic source income.128 While locationspecific rents, as well as a robust labor market, might support a
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 54–55.
Shaviro, Crossroads, supra note 106, at 10–11.
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high U.S. tax rate on domestic source income, such factors likely
do not support taxation of foreign source income at the same levels.129 In other words, it is efficient for a country to tax foreign
source income at a lower rate than domestic source income because it can exercise its market power more with respect to the
latter, thereby making the former more tax-elastic.130 On the
other hand, the residence country should prefer to impose some
degree of taxation on a resident company’s foreign source income
since doing so discourages profit-shifting and also brings in revenues.131
Perhaps because of this balancing act, every tax system unilaterally seems to tax foreign source income of resident companies more lightly than domestic source income.132 In the old
worldwide system, the United States’ tolerance of deferral effectively created a disparity in the rates on domestic and foreign
source income, favoring the latter.133 Under the new system, that
choice is more explicit, with foreign source income obtaining a
50% deduction.134 And in pure territorial systems, active foreign
source income is exempt.135 Thus, it seems that this purported
goal for tax treaties—to constrain the top rate residence countries can impose on foreign source income—would likely be
achieved in the absence of the treaties. Although Kane and Shaheen’s careful work is helpful in detailing how tax treaties can
accommodate partial creditability of foreign taxes, we have yet
to find a good reason for tax treaties in the first place.
In short, without the concept of double taxation as a guide
for setting jurisdictional limits, there does not seem to be any
basis to have strict reciprocity of rates through a bilateral solution. Domestic legislation could instead achieve lower withholding rates. Reciprocity, as a goal of tax treaties, comes under further scrutiny when one examines the asymmetry of investment
flows and tax systems, as discussed below.136

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Shaviro, supra note 55, at 63.
Shaviro, Response, supra note 106, at 138.
Shaviro, Crossroads, supra note 106, at 2.
26 U.S.C. § 250 (2018).
Shaviro, supra note 55, at 57.
See infra Part II.D.
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B. THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION
The other stated purpose of tax treaties is the prevention of
fiscal evasion.137 Traditionally, this rationale supported the exchange of relevant information. Article 26, which implements
this principle, however, is ineffective. In both the U.S. and
OECD Model Treaties, a party does not have to provide information which “is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal
course of the administration” or which “would disclose any trade,
business, industrial, commercial, or professional secret or trade
process.”138 For many years, countries like Luxembourg and
Switzerland took the position that these carve-outs specifically
allowed bank secrecy to trump information exchange.139
More generally, a treaty is an odd mechanism to induce
banking havens to share information. The United States may
care very deeply about wanting information from a banking haven, but there is no reciprocal desire on the haven’s side.140 They
therefore have no incentive to fulfill their agreement.141 Moreover, when evasion spans multiple countries, the bilateral format
of the income tax treaty does little to solve the problem.142
To the extent exchange of information by international
agreement is desirable, there are other means to achieve it. Tax
information exchange agreements (TIEAs), based on a 2002
OECD model agreement, allow countries to exchange information on taxpayers without also reallocating taxing jurisdiction.143 In their first decade, over 500 TIEAs were signed.144

137. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32 (entitling the treaty as “for
the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of tax evasion”).
138. Id. art. 26(3); OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 30, art. 26(3).
139. Lee A. Sheppard, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Part 4: Ineffectual Information
Sharing, 53 TAX NOTES INT’L 1139, 1142 (2009).
140. Id. at 1140.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS (2002), https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of
-tax-information/2082215.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7G3-AK6P].
144. Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/
taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm [https://perma.cc/HL5M-NKHW]
(listing such agreements). To be sure, this number includes tax havens signing
agreements with one another, expressing a commitment that likely cannot be
taken seriously.
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Newer tools, like domestic legislation and implementing bilateral agreements, can also be used to yield information exchange.
In 2010, for instance, the United States enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) to stop tax evasion by its
residents.145 FATCA requires foreign banks and financial institutions to provide information on U.S. taxpayers and their financial accounts.146 The novel feature of FATCA is a 30% withholding tax on U.S. source income paid to taxpayers that have not
provided information regarding their residency or identity of
their owners.147
FATCA requirements, in most cases, violated the financial
institutions’ countries’ internal laws.148 Intergovernmental
agreements (IGAs) became necessary to implement FATCA.149
According to the U.S. Treasury, the United States has agreed to
113 IGAs since 2010.150 Subsequent to FATCA, the OECD developed the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) based on the
IGAs.151 The CRS is an automatic information exchange, which
over 100 countries have agreed to implement, and allows other
countries to implement FATCA-like obligations with non-U.S.
counterparties.152
Clearly, FATCA has been a watershed act and, along with
the rise of other instruments, calls into question the continuing

145. Though initially introduced as a separate bill, the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act was passed as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010). The primary provisions of
FATCA relevant to this discussion are codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1471 (2018).
146. 26 U.S.C. § 1471(c).
147. Id. § 1471(a).
148. John S. Wisiackas, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: What It Could
Mean for the Future of Financial Privacy and International Law, 31 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 585, 599 (2017).
149. Id. at 596.
150. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA
.aspx [https://perma.cc/78CB-FJZM] (last updated Jan. 13, 2020) (listing such
agreements). These agreements are at various stages of completion and, in some
cases, have only been agreed to in substance.
151. Major Enlargement of the Global Network for the Automatic Exchange
of Offshore Account Information as over 100 Jurisdictions Get Ready for Exchanges, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (May 7, 2018), http://www.oecd
.org/tax/major-enlargement-of-the-global-network-for-the-automatic-exchange
-of-offshore-account-information-as-over-100-jurisdictions-get-ready-for
-exchanges.htm [https://perma.cc/M5UK-Z4MA].
152. Id.
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relevance of Article 26. Although IGAs, in their current form,
lack reciprocal commitments by the United States, IGAs have
done much to eliminate bank secrecy worldwide and have also
influenced a global information exchange network. The information exchange world has clearly moved beyond double income
tax treaties.
That being said, because IGAs were entered into outside of
the Article II treaty process, the executive branch asserted their
legality by characterizing them as add-ons to existing tax treaties.153 If the United States jettisoned the information exchange
provisions in the treaties (which I do not recommend), then this
could jeopardize the legality of the IGAs. Even if this was the
case, however, there are additional arguments supporting the legality of the IGAs on a standalone basis, either as binding administrative guidance or as congressional-executive agreements.154
There is, however, an additional concern that if the jurisdictional provisions of the treaties are unwound, then political economy considerations will also lead to less support of the information exchange provisions. Under this view, taxpayers tolerate
information exchange only because they are receiving relief of
source country taxation in exchange. I am somewhat dubious of
this account. In fact, the reverse dynamic has been present. Until recently, the information exchange requirements jeopardized
the United States’ entrance into new tax treaties, with Senator
Rand Paul blocking action on the treaties for almost a decade out
of protest of FATCA.155 Information exchange has proliferated
and evolved into a strong norm in the international arena, and
the FATCA regime thus far has withstood strong pressure
against it. If this concern remains, however, the jurisdictional
provisions could be weakened but not eliminated, which I discuss
in Part V below.156

153. Susan Morse, Why FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements Bind the
U.S. Government, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L 245, 246 (2013). For a view disputing this
characterization, see Allison Christians, The Dubious Legal Pedigree of IGAs
(and Why It Matters), 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 565, 565 (2013).
154. Morse, supra note 153, at 246–47.
155. Diane Ring, When International Tax Agreements Fail at Home: A U.S.
Example, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1185, 1197–206 (2016).
156. See infra Part V.
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C. DOUBLE NON-TAXATION
In accordance with the BEPS plan, the purpose of treaties
has since grown to encompass the principle of double non-taxation, supporting devices like limitation on benefits provisions
and the unilateral override provisions in the new U.S. Model
Treaty.157 Although these developments combat treaty abuse
and double non-taxation, they are effectively solving problems
created, in part, by the treaties themselves. Therefore, they cannot be invoked to justify the existence of tax treaties, as will be
explained below.
What is double non-taxation and why is it problematic? After all, almost every type of taxation distorts economic activity,
so should not less taxation assist in the free movement of capital? Double non-taxation generally means income that is otherwise typically taxed in one jurisdiction ends up being taxed nowhere. The phenomenon is sometimes referred to in the
literature as stateless income or homeless income.158 The OECD
describes double non-taxation as leading to “a reduction of the
overall tax paid by all parties involved as a whole, which harms
competition, economic efficiency, transparency and fairness.”159
One primary concern with double non-taxation is the creation of
a race to the bottom, whereby all jurisdictions are worse off due
to tax competition.160 Another concern is the preference of crossborder income as contrasted with wholly domestic income, a concern expressed in the state aid cases.161
Resolving the phenomena is difficult as a conceptual matter
because the problem results from the sovereignty of countries
over their own tax systems. Since tax treaties, in their current
incarnation, never require taxation of income but instead function as devices that limit taxing jurisdiction, it is unclear how
they can ever solve the problem of double non-taxation. Instead,
157. For example, the new model treaty denies treaty benefits to beneficiaries of “special tax regimes,” or special tax preferences put in place by some countries. See Allison Christians & Alexander Ezenagu, Kill-Switches in the U.S.
Model Tax Treaty, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1043, 1048 (2016).
158. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX
L. REV. 99, 99 (2011); Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless
Income: Collection at Source Is the Linchpin, 65 TAX L. REV. 535, 538 (2012).
159. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 15 (2013).
160. See Ruth Mason, Tax Rulings as State Aid FAQ, 154 TAX NOTES 451,
452 (2017).
161. See id. at 459.
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tax treaties tend to create double non-taxation because they allow taxpayers to combine reduced treaty rates on source-based
withholding taxes with favorable domestic tax rules.162 In order
to fix double non-taxation, domestic law must be utilized, and,
at best, tax treaties may be designed to not make the situation
worse.163
What features of tax treaties, then, give rise to double nontaxation? This stems from the grand bargain struck between
source and residence countries, with the residence countries obtaining the right to tax “residual income” after a minimal
amount of income has been allocated to the source country.164 As
Bret Wells and Cym H. Lowell have stated, “Our treaties were
premised on the concept of allocating income to prevent double
taxation, but the result is that they have achieved double nontaxation.”165 The two demonstrate that the phenomenon of double non-taxation arises from the League of Nations’ choice to
adopt a residence-based approach rather than one based on
profit-splitting.166
The question that the tax treaties were originally trying to
resolve was how to allocate income between a parent company,
typically located in a mercantilist country like England (the “residence” country, in today’s terminology), and its supply, manufacturing, and shipping subsidiaries, typically located in British
Commonwealth countries like India (the “source” country).167
The subsidiaries would pay “base erosion payments,” such as
royalties, service fees, and leasehold payments to the parent,

162. Christians & Ezenagu, supra note 157, at 1046.
163. David Rosenbloom has made a similar point, arguing that international
tax arbitrage exploits the differences in domestic laws. See H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: International Tax Arbitrage and the
“International Tax System,” 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 164–65 (2000). Tax treaties, in
Rosenbloom’s view, are always elective and to the benefit of the taxpayer. In
that regard, treaties do not have the leverage to combat tax arbitrage. Id. at
164.
164. This term has been defined as the “portion of income earned by all parties to cross-border transactions (‘combined income’) that remains after a routine return has been allocated to each of the related parties for the functions
and risks that it performs (‘residual income’).” Wells & Lowell, supra note 20,
at 5 n.9.
165. Id. at 5.
166. Wells and Lowell label the phenomenon of double non-taxation as
“homeless income.” Id.
167. Id. at 10.
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which would be deductible against their colonial income tax.168
In this manner, residual profits were stripped out of the source
country, leaving it only the ability to tax routine profits.169
Under these facts, the income is being taxed by the mercantilist country. With the interposition of a holding company situated in a tax haven, however, the residual profits could be shifted
to a jurisdiction that does not tax such income through base erosion payments. Although the colonial country could assert that
the arm’s length principle allocates it a certain portion of the
profit, typically transfer pricing methods are limited to the income that should be received by the source country, thereby failing to police the income allocated to the holding company.170 As
Wells and Lowell note, this planning strategy primarily stems
from several elements bound up in the tax treaty framework: (1)
the decision to allocate residual income to the residence country,
with the source country only taxing local operations, (2) the interposition of a holding company that is not treated as a permanent establishment and is entitled to receive residual income
(and thereby treated as situated in the residence country), and
(3) the deployment of one-sided transfer pricing.171
In pursuing the approach ultimately adopted by the League
of Nations treaty, the four economists were aware of the danger
that holding companies in tax havens posed.172 They recognized
that such subsidiaries allowed the allocation of income to a country that was neither a source or residence country, thus creating
the potential for electivity into a low-taxed regime.173 Perhaps,
though, they glossed over these concerns because they assumed
the residence country would ultimately find ways to tax such income. As it turns out, however, income shifted to holding companies has gone largely untaxed by residence countries.174 Tax
competition has spurred residence countries in this direction,
less they face expatriation by their multinational corporations to
a country that does not tax such income.175

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 11.
Id.
See id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
1923 Report, supra note 12, at 49.
Id.
Wells & Lowell, supra note 20, at 35–36.
Id.
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For instance, even under its former worldwide system, the
United States allowed deferral on income allocated to subsidiaries in tax havens.176 Although various outbound regimes (such
as controlled foreign corporation rules) and inbound regimes
(such as earnings-stripping and thin capitalization rules) have
attempted to tax such income, tax competition has also caused
countries to rationally tolerate profit shifting.177 Arguably, the
new tax regime instituted by the United States, with BEAT and
GILTI, will strengthen taxation of previously untaxed earnings.
In previous work, however, I have argued that the new law
largely keeps base erosion and profit shifting incentives intact.178 Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates
that nearly 80% of profit shifting is maintained under the new
regime.179 The effect on profit shifting is likely even smaller,
since CBO does not take into account investor reactions to the
instability of the FDII regime in response to WTO challenges,
investor reactions to the political instability of the legislation in
general, and tax competition from other countries.180 Furthermore, commentators and treaty partners have critiqued the new
provisions for violating the tax treaties.181 As a result, U.S. lawmakers may face future pressures to curtail the regimes on a bilateral basis.

176. See generally JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX
HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION (2015).
177. Alexander Klemm & Li Liu, The Impact of Profit Shifting on Economic
Activity and Tax Competition (IMF Working Papers 19/287, 2019), https://www
.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/12/20/The-Impact-of-Profit-Shifting
-on-Economic-Activity-and-Tax-Competition-48741 [https://perma.cc/RWX5
-B6JD].
178. See generally Rebecca M. Kysar, Critiquing (and Repairing) the New
International Tax Regime, 128 YALE L.J.F. 339 (2018) (highlighting the flaws of
the new U.S. international tax regime).
179. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018–
2028, at 124–25, 127 (2018). For instance, AbbVie Inc., a biopharmaceutical
company recently reported a tax rate of 9%, decreased from around 22% in years
prior to the 2017 tax legislation. See Michael Erman & Tom Bergin, How U.S.
Tax Reform Rewards Companies That Shift Profit to Tax Havens, REUTERS
(June 18, 2018, 6:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-abbvie/
how-u-s-tax-reform-rewards-companies-that-shift-profit-to-tax-havens
-idUSKBN1JE12Q [https://perma.cc/7FXF-95U3].
180. Kysar, supra note 178, at 347 (noting effects the new U.S. international
tax regime has on profit sharing).
181. See, e.g., Rosenbloom & Shaheen, supra note 3, at 63 (“We believe that
the BEAT’s conflicts with the nondiscrimination provision and its reconcilable

1788

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1755

Tax treaties, however, do seem to be inching closer to addressing double non-taxation.182 As stated in the official press
release of the new model treaty, the U.S. Treasury has taken the
position that tax treaties should eliminate double taxation “without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation
through tax evasion or avoidance.”183 To further this relatively
modest goal, the new model treaty contains somewhat unique
“kill-switch” provisions that turn off treaty benefits if income is
subject to low or no taxation abroad.184 For instance, the special
tax regime provisions deny treaty benefits on deductible interest
or royalties to related persons that face low or no taxation under
a preferential tax regime.185 In this manner, the rules preserve
source taxation when the residence country forgoes taxation of
the item of income. The treaty also provides that treaty benefits
relating to dividends, interest, royalties, and other income may
be denied if a treaty partner either (a) reduces its tax rates to
below the lesser of 15% of 60% of the general statutory rate or
(b) switches to a territorial regime.186 Other changes to both the
U.S. and OECD model treaties attempt to minimize double nontaxation.187 These changes include addressing exempt permanent establishments, revisions to the limitation on benefits provisions, rules on expatriated entities, and the new general antiabuse rule adopted in the multilateral instrument.188
Reuven Avi-Yonah has argued that the international tax regime embraces a principle that income should be taxed once and

inconsistency with the FTC provision of U.S. treaties do not constitute treaty
overrides.”).
182. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Gianluca Mazzoni, Are Taxes Converging? 3 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 573, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3059090 (“Despite the existence of many such examples of double non-taxation, it is clear that the tendency in recent years has been for most large countries to support the single tax principle.”).
183. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, at 1.
184. As Allison Christians has noted, these type of “kill-switch” provisions,
whereby treaty benefits are turned off under certain circumstances, are rare but
not unprecedented. Christians & Ezenagu, supra note 157, at 1059–69.
185. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, arts. 11(2)(c), at 23, 12(2)(a), at 27,
& 21(2)(a), at 40.
186. Id. art. 28, at 67.
187. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 4.
188. Id. at 3–5, 9–10, 16.
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only once.189 He has pointed to these recent treaty developments
as further indication that the world is converging upon this “single tax principle.”190 Ample room for double non-taxation under
the treaties still exists, however. There is much uncertainty as
to the definition of what constitutes a “special tax regime” if such
regimes are not explicitly identified during the treaty negotiations. Moreover, if such a regime is implemented through administrative practice, the United States might not be able to detect
it if it cannot access taxpayer-specific rulings.191
Finally, it is the treaty regime and its fundamental bargain
between source and residence countries that is a primary cause
of a great deal of double non-taxation. That treaty partners are
now undoing some of the treaties’ contribution to double nontaxation through mechanisms like the unilateral override and
anti-abuse provisions cannot be seen as justification for the treaties.
D. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Increased foreign direct investment (FDI) is another cited
reason for tax treaties.192 We would expect foreign direct investment to increase upon entrance into a tax treaty for two reasons.
First, if tax treaties really do alleviate double taxation, then we

189. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay
on the History of U.S. Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 305, 309 (2014)
(“The single tax principle states that income should be subject to tax only once,
and thus rejects both double taxation and double non-taxation.”); see also Hugh
J. Ault, Some Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax
Principles, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L 1195, 1195 (2013) (noting that the League of
Nations advocated a scheme in which income is taxed “once and only once”).
190. Avi-Yonah & Mazzoni, supra note 182, at 3. This principle has been
controversial both descriptively and as a normative goal. Rosenbloom, supra
note 163, at 166 (stating that “[i]nvoking the international tax system does not
constitute an explanation, since that system appears to be imaginary”); see also
SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 21; Graetz, supra note 5, at 270 n.29 (citing Rosenbloom, supra note 163); Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S61, S71 (2002) (same).
191. Christians & Ezenagu, supra note 157, at 1075; Ruth Mason, Identifying Illegal Subsidies, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 479, 515–16 (2019) (discussing use of
secret administrative rulings as a method to confer illegal subsidies to private
companies).
192. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 108 n.88 (providing an excellent summary of
the literature on FDI and tax treaties).
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would expect foreign direct investment between the two countries to increase.193 Second, the treaties may enhance the treaty
country’s reputation among the global economy, a benefit that
would expand as the country’s treaty network expands.194
Empirical evidence on whether tax treaties bring in foreign
direct investment, however, is mixed.195 Several older studies
looked at changes in FDI on a jurisdictional basis as countries
entered into tax treaties and concluded that there was no increase in FDI.196 Newer studies have looked at whether a greater
number of tax treaties is correlated with higher FDI and have
found a positive relationship between the two.197 It is difficult to
confirm causation, however, “since treaties may precede investment not because they spur the latter but because they may be
concluded only when there is an expectation of such investment.”198 In the United States, for instance, this is a built-in feature of treaty policy.199

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Paul L. Baker, An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and Their
Effect on Foreign Direct Investment, 21 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 341, 362 (2014) (finding no effect on FDI flows); Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, Do Bilateral
Tax Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS
526 (E. Kwan Choi & James C. Hartigan eds., 2005) (finding a positive effect on
FDI from old treaties but a slight negative effect from new treaties); Bruce A.
Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI
Activity, 11 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 601, 602 (2004) (same); Ronald B. Davies, Tax
Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential Versus Performance, 11 INT’L
TAX & PUB. FIN. 775, 784 (2004) (finding no effect on FDI from U.S. treaties);
Peter Egger et al., The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on Foreign Direct
Investment: Theory and Evidence, 39 CAN. J. ECON. 901, 902 (2006) (finding a
negative effect on FDI); Eric Neumayer, Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 43 J. DEV. STUD. 1501, 1502
(2007) (finding some effect in attracting FDI, but only in limited circumstances).
196. See, e.g., Blonigen & Davies, supra note 195; Davies, supra note 195, at
776; Egger et al., supra note 195, at 921–24.
197. Julian di Giovanni, What Drives Capital Flows? The Case of Cross-Border M&A Activity and Financial Deepening, 65 J. INT’L ECON. 127, 145 (2005)
(demonstrating how “capital tax treaties increase M&A activity”); Neumayer,
supra note 195, at 1515 (examining how tax treatises “fulfill the purpose of attracting FDI”).
198. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 77, at 26.
199. Id.
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One other study has reached both conclusions.200 It finds
that the number of treaties that a source country has signed with
the United States is positively correlated with FDI from the
United States, while also concluding that there is a negative correlation between new and existing treaties with the United
States and such FDI.201 One explanation for this is that a large
network of treaties increases profit shifting through the source
country by means of treaty shopping.202 On the other hand, new
and existing treaties that are renegotiated may reduce FDI and
reinvested earnings because of the information sharing and tax
cooperation features of tax treaties.203
The FDI effect is likely to be particularly muted in the case
of developed countries like the United States since the treaty is
not needed to signal regime stability to investors in that context.
Moreover, if tax treaties are increasing FDI because of treaty
shopping, developed countries may not benefit from that effect
given the relatively higher rates of taxation imposed by such
countries.
Furthermore, investment in the United States may also be
more inelastic than other jurisdictions. This may be the case if
demand for U.S. assets is strong enough to support withholding.204 For instance, although the United States taxes real property, foreign ownership of U.S. real assets remains robust.205 The
strong U.S. market for goods and services may mean that foreign
demand could support higher withholding rates on outbound
flows.206

200. Joseph P. Daniels et al., Bilateral Tax Treaties and US Foreign Direct
Investment Financing Modes, 22 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 999, 1025–26 (2015).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1025.
204. Driessen, supra note 44, at 749 (“However, investment in the United
States may be more inelastic than commonly is perceived—that is, demand by
foreign persons for U.S. assets is strong enough that increases in U.S. withholding on outbound flows may not make much difference in a foreign person’s decision to invest.”).
205. Id. at 749 n.25 (“FIRPTA does not seem to have curbed the demand by
foreign persons for U.S. residential and other real property.”).
206. Id. (“[T]he sizable U.S. market for goods and services likely is important
enough to [foreign owners] that higher U.S. withholding rates on outbound
flows from inbound FDI might not discourage inbound FDI very much.”).
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Although the U.S. statutory withholding rate of 30% is quite
high,207 the portfolio interest exemption and availability of derivatives drastically reduce the number of taxpayers subject to
the tax.208 In this sense, the reduced treaty rates do little work.
If treaties did not exist, then surely the domestic withholding
rate would be set much lower, thereby alleviating concerns of
over-taxation. In all likelihood, the reason that the 30% rate has
held so long is that it is a way for the United States to preserve
its negotiating position in the treaty context.209 Some would argue that using the domestic rate as leverage is valuable, and
thus the treaties allow the United States to tailor their policymaking to their relationship with particular countries. As I explore throughout the Article, however, our monolithic negotiating positions mute this benefit, and, in any case, domestic law
could be used to achieve similar results. For instance, the statutory withholding rate could be applicable to certain countries
with whom we have diplomatic relationships or that meet other
enumerated criteria.210
E. COMITY CONSIDERATIONS
Related to the issue of increased foreign direct investment,
it is also posited that countries enter into tax treaties for comity
reasons.211 Tax treaties solidify relationships between countries
and create communication channels between their taxing authorities.212 For developing countries especially, entering into

207. See IRS, WITHHOLDING OF TAX (2020).
208. See David R. Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455,
456–57 (1996) (noting the impact of exemptions and derivatives on the market).
209. Jones, supra note 1, at 3 (“The reason why treaties do not lead to harmonization of tax law is . . . the need to preserve one’s negotiating position.”).
210. For instance, under current law, the foreign tax credit is denied for
taxes paid to countries with whom we have severed diplomatic relations. See 26
U.S.C. § 901(j)(2)(a)(ii) (2018) (“This subsection shall apply to any foreign country . . . with respect to which the United States has severed diplomatic relations.”).
211. Christians, supra note 1, at 706–07 (“It has been suggested that tax
treaties may signal a stable investment and business climate in which treaty
partners express their dedication to protecting and fostering foreign investment . . . . [T]ax treaties may serve largely to signal that a country is willing to
adopt the international norms regarding trade and investment, and hence, that
the country is a safe place to invest.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
212. Brauner, supra note 90, at 988 (comparing international tax treatises
to membership cards that “emphasize their role as comity mechanisms”).
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the “club” of tax treaties improves a nation’s standing in the international arena, serving as a “stamp of approval.”213 Signing a
tax treaty signals that the country “is willing to adopt the international norms,” which may have positive effects in non-tax areas as well.214
Although such benefits might accrue to a developing country
attempting to gain a seat at the table, they are less likely to sway
the position of the United States, whose existing trade relationships and agreements with other countries dwarf the impact of
tax treaties. Moreover, an established tax administration that is
willing to robustly enforce tax norms, like the IRS, produces a
more effective signaling effect to other nations.215 Comity considerations should therefore be relatively minor in factoring into
the decision of whether the United States should enter into tax
treaties.
F. CERTAINTY AND PREDICTABILITY
Tax treaties are also said to signify a stable and certain legal
regime. Many would argue that the current international tax regime is fairly harmonized, and this is partly due to the existence
of the treaty network.216 The OECD Model has been incredibly
influential, and the more than 3000 tax treaties in existence are
based upon it.217 One scholar has noted that, “[o]ne can pick up
any modern tax treaty and immediately find one’s way around,
often even down to the article number.”218 As a result, tax treaties are quite similar to one another.
To the extent that standardization of international tax rules
has occurred, however, we see it outside of the tax treaty context

213. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 113.
214. Vann, supra note 1, at 726.
215. Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 167–68 (discussing the importance of
“robust legislation” as an important signal to other countries).
216. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Does Customary International Tax Law
Exist? (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 640, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3382203 (examining the harmonization of the current international tax regime and customary international law).
217. See Yariv Brauner & Pasquale Pistone, Introduction to BRICS AND THE
EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION 3 n.4 (Yariv Brauner &
Pasquale Pistone eds., 2015) (“[The international tax regime] is constructed
around the network of bilateral tax treatises, essentially all of which are modelled on the OECD convention.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
218. Jones, supra note 1, at 2.
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as well—in the domestic laws of nations.219 For instance, in the
United States, a foreign person will be taxed on U.S. business
income if it is “effectively connected” to a “U.S. trade or business.” Tax treaties attempt to clarify and harmonize this concept
by narrowing source country jurisdiction over “business profits”
that are “attributable to a permanent establishment.”220 The
treaty standard, however, appears to be no clearer than the domestic one, causing many to conclude that it is essentially equivalent to the domestic standard.221 Indeed, some of the U.S. tax
treaties explicitly define the term “business profits” in a way that
references the domestic law.222 The Internal Revenue Service
has drawn upon domestic law to interpret what constitutes a
“permanent establishment,” referencing concepts that are also
used to determine the domestic standard.223 This is the case for
other treaty terms as well.224
As stated earlier, the treaties generally defer to domestic
law to answer vexing and central questions as to the residency
of the taxpayer, what type of income is at issue, and the definition of income taxes.225 Tax treaties are primarily jurisdictional
devices and “mostly lack operative provisions of law” that would
more meaningfully harmonize the tax regimes of various nations.226 Even as jurisdictional devices, however, the treaties

219. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage, and the International Tax Regime, 61 BULL. INT’L TAX’N, no. 4, 2007, at 130 (contending
that a coherent international tax regime exists in both tax treaties and the domestic law of all nations).
220. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 7, at 15.
221. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Why Do We Need Treaties?, 68 TAX NOTES
INT’L 783 (2012); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Oz Halabi, Double or Nothing: A Tax
Treaty for the 21st Century 1–2 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working
Papers, Paper No. 66, 2012), http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1176&context=law_econ_current.
222. Allison Christians & Yariv Brauner, United States, in 7 THE MEANING
OF “ENTERPRISE,” “BUSINESS” AND “BUSINESS PROFITS” UNDER TAX TREATIES
AND EU TAX LAW 591–93 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2011).
223. Kysar, supra note 47, at 1413–14.
224. Christians & Brauner, supra note 222, at 601 (“In general, the terms
‘business, enterprise, and business profits’ as used in the U.S. tax treaties are
not autonomous but derive their meaning from domestic tax law provisions.”).
225. See supra Part II.C; see also Kysar, supra note 47, at 1411–12 (noting
that “specific treaty provisions dictate that domestic law applies when defining
a term”).
226. Kysar, supra note 47, at 1411.
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merely “state general taxing principles” whereas “[c]ode provisions are tailored to specific situations.”227
The extent to which tax treaties harmonize international
law is thus limited. This may be due to various reasons. For one,
tax law is an area of law that has to address “nearly all economic
activities” and encompasses all business entities and individuals, all while aiming to meet “critical revenue-raising and redistribution functions.”228 Given the complexities of these tasks, an
intricate body of domestic law has arisen. Even still, the statutory text does not often address the specific fact pattern in question and thus reliance upon non-textual sources is necessary to
fill interpretive gaps.229 Plain meaning interpretation also often
seems inappropriate in the tax setting given the self-containing
nature of tax law, which creates specialized tax terms that do
not have analogues in everyday conversation.230 The highly detailed character of the domestic law means that treatymakers
may be unable to incorporate concepts directly; instead, they intentionally leave gaps in the treaty so that domestic law can fill
in the details.231
Another reason for the gaps in treaties is “the connection
between taxation and state sovereignty.”232 Treaties often defer
to domestic law so that nations can retain some control over tax
policy.233 Although international law always implicates sovereignty concerns, these issues are particularly strong in the tax
context given that taxation implicates the revenue function of a

227. KLAUS VOGEL ET AL., UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 26 (1989).
228. Kysar, supra note 47, at 1414.
229. See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative
History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 829–30
(1991) (“[A] complex statute may suggest a broader policy that requires a nonliteral, contextual interpretation . . . of the statute.”).
230. Id. at 828–29 (“The self-contained nature of tax law makes a plain
meaning rule difficult to apply to tax cases.”).
231. Kysar, supra note 47, at 1416 (“The highly complex demands upon tax
law are one reason for the contemplated gaps in treaty drafting.”).
232. Id.
233. Id.
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nation, which in turns provides public goods and national defense.234 Taxation is also a key component of a nation’s fiscal policy, which allows it to affect growth, prices, and unemployment.235
It is also important to note that, unlike in the trade context
where multilateral cooperation can contribute simultaneously to
worldwide and national efficiency, international tax is predominantly a zero-sum game.236 For all of these reasons, we should
expect a significant degree of retention of sovereignty in the tax
treaty context. In fact, we do see this, both implicitly, through
ambiguity in the treaties, and explicitly, through incorporation
of the domestic tax laws.237 Accordingly, the degree to which tax
treaties can provide certainty through the harmonization of tax
concepts and terms is limited.
As for stability, the network of more than 3000 treaties provides some benefits in this regard. Indeed, as Tsilly Dagan has
noted, the treaty system creates a lock-in effect, which makes
transition to a different system more difficult.238 There is, however, a serious cost to this stability, the dangers of which have
become apparent. Long after the system proves useful, it will
continue.
G. OTHER GOALS
Tax treaties also may serve ancillary goals such as the prevention of nondiscrimination or the resolution of tax disputes between the governments. Both of these goals can be accomplished
via other means, however. Tax treaties require competent authorities to endeavor to resolve cross-border tax disputes and,
increasingly, provide for mandatory arbitration.239 As was the

234. Id.; see also Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?:
International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 157, 167 (2008)
(noting the “particular strength to the claims for tax sovereignty”).
235. Ring, supra note 234, at 168–69.
236. See generally Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001) (noting that the self-interests of
the nation should be served through international tax policy).
237. Kysar, supra note 47, at 1417 (“We therefore should expect a greater
degree of retention of national policy in the tax treaty context. And we
do . . . through reference to domestic tax laws.”).
238. Tsilly Dagan, Tax Treaties as a Network Product, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
1081, 1101–05 (2016).
239. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 25, at 57.
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case with information exchange, there is no need to couple this
goal with the divvying up of taxing jurisdiction.240 Other international agreements, like the approach taken by the European
Union, can serve the same purpose.241
Tax treaties also are said to accelerate international investment through their nondiscrimination clauses, which require
that the treaty partners tax domestic and foreign investors similarly.242 These clauses appear in every U.S. tax treaty in force,
as well as the model U.S. and OECD tax treaties.243 Again, nondiscrimination could also be accomplished without the loss of
taxing rights, through stripped-down tax treaties, investment
treaties, or domestic legislation.244 Indeed, major multilateral
and regional trade agreements already contain mandates
against tax discrimination.245 The nondiscrimination principle
as articulated in tax treaties was originally intended only to mirror existing obligations under the commercial treaties and was
not expected to have a meaningful impact.246
240. See Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 166–67 (discussing how international tax treaties can “generate information sought by tax authorities”).
241. Id. (citing Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises—Final Act—
Joint Declarations-Unilateral Declarations 90/436, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10 (EC);
Protocol Amending the Convention of 23 July 1999 on the Elimination of Double
taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, 1999 O.J. (C 202) 1 (EC)).
242. See generally U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24, at 54 (example of nondiscrimination provision); OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 30, art.
16, at 24–25 (same); Ruth Mason, Tax Discrimination and Capital Neutrality,
2 WORLD TAX J. 126 (2010) (comparing nondiscrimination provisions in tax treaties, WTO, and EU law); Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What Is Tax Discrimination?, 121 YALE L.J. 1014 (2012) (analyzing the use of nondiscrimination provisions in tax treaties).
243. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24, at 54; RICHARD E. ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES ¶ 20.01 (2010)
(providing an overview of nondiscrimination clauses in all U.S. income tax treaties).
244. Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 167 (noting the use of nondiscrimination clauses for facilitating international investment).
245. Mason & Knoll, supra note 242, at 1018 (“[P]rohibitions of tax discrimination appear in major multilateral and regional trade agreements.”).
246. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM OF
THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT ON THE CONVENTION WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME, art. 21 (1945) (“It will
be observed that this article extends to all taxes, both Federal and local. Such
extension, however, is in keeping with several commercial treaties (such as that
with Norway, of 1928, and that with Germany, of 1923) to which the United
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Nondiscrimination is a notoriously ambiguous and, at least
in U.S. law, narrow concept.247 Under the “nationality paragraph” of Article 24, the treaties bar the source country from taxing foreign enterprises operating in that country in a way that is
“more burdensome” than nationals of the source state in “the
same circumstances.”248 Its scope is limited since the treaties define “similar circumstances” as excluding U.S. nationals that are
taxed on a worldwide basis.249 This preserves the ability of the
United States, for instance, to impose gross basis withholding
taxes on nonresident aliens since they are not in the same circumstances as a nonresident U.S. citizen (who gets taxed on a
net basis).250 In the case of corporations, this carve-out means
the nondiscrimination principle has very limited impact in the
United States. A corporation that is incorporated abroad is, by
definition, not in the same circumstances as a corporation that
is incorporated in the U.S.251 Other countries may define corporate residency on the basis of other factors, such as place of management, in which case nondiscrimination may have more impact.252
Under the permanent establishment paragraph of Article
24, a country is prohibited from subjecting the permanent establishment (essentially the fixed place of business) of a resident of
the other country to “less favorabl[e]” taxation than its own residents “carrying on the same activities.”253 The permanent establishment paragraph has no such carve-out for residency, but it is
often a struggle for courts and the Internal Revenue Service to
determine whether foreign residents are “carrying on the same
States is now a party. It has no practical effect, since our domestic taxation does
not discriminate as between United States citizens and British nationals residing in the United States.”); Mary C. Bennett, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture—
Nondiscrimination in International Tax Law: A Concept in Search of a Principle, 59 TAX L. REV. 439, 444 (2006) (discussing original intentions of nondiscrimination provisions).
247. Mason & Knoll, supra note 242, at 1017 (“[J]udges, government officials, and scholars have failed to clearly articulate the . . . values . . . the nondiscrimination provision promotes.”).
248. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24, at 54.
249. Id.
250. Bennett, supra note 246, at 445.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 446.
253. Id. at 447 (discussing the U.S. Model Treaty with respect to the permanent establishment provision); see also U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art.
24(2).
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activities” as residents of the permanent establishment country.254 Although one U.S. court has found that a U.S. tax provision violated this paragraph,255 the U.S. Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service have traditionally taken a very narrow view
of this phrase.256 For instance, in assessing thin capitalization
rules, which deny certain interest deductions for payments to related foreign persons, the position of the United States has been
that these rules do not violate nondiscrimination because they
also deny deductibility to related domestic tax-exempt entities.257 This defense is arguably unconvincing since the nonresident, for-profit lender should be compared to a resident, forprofit lender.258 European courts, in contrast, have given the paragraph more robust interpretations.259
Given the uncertainty surrounding the nondiscrimination
principle and the large divide between countries in interpreting
it, query whether it would be more effective to enact it as a domestic provision. These routes may be a more forceful means at
ensuring equal treatment of investments. Regardless, it does not
appear that the nondiscrimination principle in treaties is providing a great deal of reciprocal protection, and in any case, like
other provisions discussed above, nondiscrimination could be incorporated into international agreements that do not cede jurisdiction over the tax base.
Finally, we could see tax treaties as serving as pre-commitment devices, tying Odysseus to the mast lest he fall prey to the
sirens’ song. Governments could recognize that they may fail to
benefit from taxing inbound capital since, absent market power,
the incidence of the tax is likely to fall on locals even if it is paid
by foreigners, creating deadweight loss in the system. Nevertheless, governments may be enticed, politically speaking, to enact

254. Bennett, supra note 246, at 447.
255. Id. (“The opinion states that under the nondiscrimination provision, the
[Internal Revenue] Service has no more right to deny interest deductions to an
‘undercapitalized’ branch than it does to an ‘undercapitalized’ domestic bank.”
(citing Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 491 (2003))).
256. Id. at 448–49 (explaining it is difficult to predict how courts would rule
on this paragraph as compared to the United States Treasury and the Internal
Revenue Service because courts have had very few opportunities to do so).
257. H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 568 (1989) (Conf. Rep.).
258. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., supra note 77, at 258–59.
259. Id.; see UBS AG v. Revenue & Customs Comm’r [2005] S.T.C. 589, aff’d
[2006] EWHC (Ch) 117, [2006] S.T.C. 716 (Eng.).
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such a tax since it nominally falls on a nonvoting sector, foreigners. To save themselves from this inefficient outcome, they may
bind themselves via international commitments.260
A few responses are warranted. First, this argument is
likely to apply only in the passive income context, where local
rents are absent (thus justifying non-taxation). Second, a predicate to this argument is that the inbound tax is borne by locals,
which may be likely in a small, open economy but highly unlikely
in a large, country like the United States, whose policies influence global prices, income, and interest rates.
III. DISADVANTAGES OF TAX TREATIES
The above discussion concludes that the rationales for tax
treaties are opaque and ultimately unconvincing. Meanwhile,
there are potential disadvantages that they bring to the United
States, as this Part explores.
A. A QUESTION OF REVENUES
Scholars have argued that the reciprocal nature of tax treaties disadvantages developing countries by allocating taxing jurisdiction, and hence shifting revenues, from the country where
the income is earned, typically the developing country, to the
country of the taxpayer’s residence, typically the developed country.261 This literature points to the asymmetry of the countries’
investments flows as the source of the treaty process’s unfairness
toward developing nations. Proponents of this view also cite economic evidence, discussed above, that tax treaties have no effect,
or even a negative effect, on foreign direct investment, meaning
that the developing country has sacrificed revenues for little to
no advantage in capturing investment.262
The common account is that treaties between developed nations do not cause similar revenue shifts since the countries are
similarly situated. Yet conclusions from the developing country
literature can be extended to treaties that the United States enters with other developed nations when the investment flows between those countries differ, as is often the case in the modern
era.

260. Thanks to Dan Shaviro for this point.
261. See supra note 1 for sources discussing this point.
262. See, e.g., Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 173–74.
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The treaty policy of the United States has remained relatively static since the 1960s, even though the United States has
swung from being the world’s most important net capital exporter to being a net capital importer due to the massive increase
of foreign investment into the United States.263 The change
means that the United States may lose revenue as a result of
entering into the treaty whereas before it was likely to gain revenues.264 In spite of the variances of capital flows, both historically and between nations, tax treaties remain markedly similar
to one another and to their predecessors.265
This dynamic stands in contrast to the bilateral investment
treaty context, where the United States has recognized its status
as a capital importer and has taken a more balanced approach
towards weighing its investors’ interests against state sovereignty rather than protecting just the former.266 One possible explanation for this disparity in approaches is that, under the latter, the United States is often sued as a source country, thus
compelling it to reexamine its negotiating stances ex ante.267
263. H. David Rosenbloom, Toward a New Tax Treaty Policy for a New Decade, 9 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 77, 83–84 (1991).
264. There have been no studies estimating the revenue impact of U.S. tax
treaties and how they have changed across time as the United States’ capital
flows have changed. A Dutch nonprofit has attempted to calculate lost revenue
for certain developing countries with regard to treaties entered into with the
Netherlands. See ACTIONAID, MISTREATED: THE TAX TREATIES THAT ARE DEPRIVING THE WORLD’S POOREST COUNTRIES OF VITAL REVENUE (2016),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/534391488205311904/pdf/
WPS7982.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JJS-R663]. Another working paper attempts to
assess the costs and benefits of tax treaties, using Ukraine as a case study.
Oleksii Balabushko et al., The Direct and Indirect Costs of Tax Treaty Policy:
Evidence from Ukraine (World Bank Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No.
7982, 2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/534391488205311904/
pdf/WPS7982.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Lu3-UCTD].
265. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction,
in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 99, 99 (Karl P.
Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (noting that about 75% of tax treaty terms
are identical to one another).
266. Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 361 (2015) (stating that early versions of United States bilateral investment treaties heavily favored investor interests).
267. SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43052, U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 6–8 (2013) (stating that over the past two decades, there has been a substantial increase in treaty-based investment disputes due to the increase in investment flows; ultimately, resulting in countries, including the United States,
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It may of course be possible that, although the United States
runs a deficit in the aggregate, it runs surpluses with treaty
countries. Frustratingly, the Joint Committee of Taxation makes
no revenue estimates for tax treaties nor does it include them in
the tax expenditure budget.268 This is because the treaties are
Article II treaties and bypass the normal budget process.269 The
executive branch has also chosen not to provide formal economic
analyses of tax treaties.270
Although I do not purport to undertake such a formal analysis here, I have examined a set of data regarding trade, capital,
and financial flows in an attempt to shed some modest insight
into whether treaties make economic sense for the United
States. Scholars have long pointed out that investment flow imbalances cause differences in revenue flows under tax treaties,
but, to my knowledge, there has been no attempt to look at those
flows in any detail, particularly on a system-wide basis.
First, I surveyed the bilateral balance of payments data
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, which consists of flow
data for any given quarter since 2003. Of the sixty-six countries
listed on the IRS website as having tax treaties with the United
States,271 this data included those of sixteen countries.272 Of
those sixteen countries, U.S. residents were net borrowers from
current, capital account, and financial-account transactions in

to re-evaluate “the balance of rights for investors and other economic and noneconomic policy priorities”).
268. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 33 (suggesting remedies to create budgetary
rules to allow Congress to consider costs and benefits of tax treaties).
269. Id. at 32–33.
270. Driessen, supra note 44, at 746 (“Executive branch negotiation and Senate consideration of a tax treaty are not subject to any budgetary rules or formal
mandated economic analyses . . . .”); Kysar, supra note 2, at 33. Recently, but
sporadically, JCT has added some general economic information regarding
trade flows in their explanations of tax treaties but this is by no means comprehensive. See, e.g., J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HUNGARY, JCX32-11, at 16–19 (2011).
271. United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-businesses/united-states
-income-tax-treaties-a-to-z [https://perma.cc/XG2K-Q4Q6] (last updated Jan. 8,
2020).
272. These countries are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Australia,
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and South Africa. See infra Appendix, Part
A.
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thirteen countries over the time span from 2003 to 2017,
amounting to net borrowing of approximately $11 trillion or an
average $735.2 billion per year.273 They were net lenders in only
three countries.274 For financial-account transactions alone over
this time span, U.S. residents were net borrowers in eleven and
net lenders in five,275 amounting to net lending of approximately
$3.9 trillion or an average $260.3 billion per year. We could
roughly estimate, then, that a supermajority of these sixteen tax
treaties are losing revenues.
Second, I studied the U.S. Department of Treasury Annual
Survey of Portfolio Holdings, which consists of stock data at particular points in a given year since 2003.276 The Annual Survey
lists both the value of foreign holdings of U.S. securities and the
value of U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign securities. Of the sixtysix countries listed on the IRS website, two countries did not
have sufficient security holdings to list. The remaining sixty-four
countries were examined. Notably, the Treasury data revealed
the United States had inflows of capital greater than outflows
with respect to the tax treaty countries in every year in which
data was collected except one (2006).277 From 2003 to 2017, the
net flows were negative by $22.14 trillion or an average of $1.476
trillion per year.278
I also looked at the relative flows of each country for the year
2017. Of the countries examined, thirty-six had inflows greater
than outflows, meaning there were more holdings by that country’s residents of U.S. securities than U.S. holdings of those
country’s securities.279 Twenty-eight countries had outflows
greater than inflows, meaning that U.S. investors held more of

273. These countries were France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United
Kingdom, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and
South Africa. See infra Appendix, Part A.
274. These countries were Belgium, the Netherlands, and Australia. See infra Appendix, Part A.
275. The U.S. was a net lender in Belgium, the Netherlands, Mexico, Venezuela, and Australia with respect to financial transactions. It was a net borrower with respect to France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and South Africa in such
transactions. See infra Appendix, Part A.
276. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., U.S. PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF FOREIGN SECURITIES AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2018 (2019).
277. See infra Appendix, Part B.
278. See infra Appendix, Part B.
279. See infra Appendix, Part C.
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those countries’ securities than vice versa.280 Notably, the
amount of inflows, in total, exceeded outflows by $4.54 trillion
for that year.281
Although it is clear that the flow data and stock data paints
a picture of the United States as a capital importer with respect
to its tax treaty partners, it is nonetheless difficult to conclude
with any certainty these findings impact on U.S. revenues. First,
any formal revenue analysis should account for increased investment as a result of the treaty. Second, even for the flow data,
these are just snapshots in time, reflecting only the current economic position of the United States via its treaty partners. Because the treaties are so entrenched, however, one can see the
danger of committing to them given the fact that economic flows
can reverse rather quickly and dramatically. Third, it is highly
likely that the breakdown of flows differs between income types,
which is relevant in calculating revenue losses from the treaties.
For instance, if the U.S. is a capital exporter for royalties, then
perhaps it is gaining overall from the treaties even if it is capital
importing with respect to other types of income, like interest.
This is because the treaty restricts source country jurisdiction
over royalties but generally does not alter the treatment of interest, which is generally exempt under the U.S. portfolio interest rules.282
Finally, there is a question as to how much of the income
that is lightly taxed by the treaties is heavily taxed by the domestic system. The answer could be considerably smaller than
the trade flow data suggests because, at least in the investment
income context, taxpayers can avoid tax on such income through
the portfolio interest exemption and tax planning strategies that
include the use of derivatives.283 Additionally, because the permanent establishment category overlaps so significantly with
that of the domestic U.S. trade or business concept, we would
expect revenue losses in this category to be marginal. Nonetheless, the degree of asymmetry in the flows suggests that formal
revenue analyses of the treaties are warranted.

280. See infra Appendix, Part C.
281. See infra Appendix, Part C.
282. 26 U.S.C. § 871 (2018).
283. See generally Toby Cozart, Structuring Foreign Investments in U.S.
Corporations Using Portfolio Debt Guaranteed by the Issuer’s Foreign Affiliate,
6 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 398 (1988) (discussing portfolio interest exemption in detail).
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It should also be mentioned that revenue losses can also
come about because of the interaction between the domestic law
and the treaty or the disparity in tax systems.284 For instance,
one could imagine that two similarly situated countries would
sign a tax treaty. They may reason that any rate reduction they
provide on source income of the other country’s residents would
be counterbalanced by an increase in domestic taxes through the
residual taxation of foreign source income of its own residents.
This increase occurs because the domestic residents are also receiving the benefit of lower rates in the other country. If, however, a country does not tax on a worldwide basis, the calculus is
different. Its residents may enjoy the lower foreign rate, unencumbered by residual taxation. The territorial regime means
that the lower foreign tax treaty rates will not effectuate an increase in domestic revenues. This bargain may still be in the
country’s interest, but the benefits are flowing to its residents
rather than to government coffers.285
The 2017 changes to the U.S. international tax system are
likely to complicate the revenue picture of U.S. tax treaties. For
one, the partial transition to a territorial system means that the
United States is forgoing residual taxation as a residence state
on foreign income earned by closely held corporations.286 Yet this
is counterbalanced by the new minimum tax regime that is imposed on such income. The reduction of the corporate rate all the
way to 21% means that no residual taxation will be paid on foreign income so long as U.S. corporations are taxed at a 13.125%
rate abroad.287
This picture is further exacerbated by the fact that the
blending of tax credits is allowed to reduce tax liability under
residual taxation for individuals and others who do not receive

284. See Roin, supra note 77, at 1767 (“Instead of a roughly equivalent revenue exchange, the U.S. Treasury most likely loses more money from forgoing
source taxation than it collects in additional residence taxation.”).
285. The United States’ transition to a partial territorial regime will mean
that its treaty agreements may produce less revenue than before, a point that
will be revisited below. See supra notes 51–65 and accompanying text.
286. See Eric M. Zolt, Tax Treaties and Developing Countries, 72 TAX L. REV.
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3248010
[https://perma.cc/KQ2D-9FWD] (noting that despite the reduction of sourcecountry revenues through tax treaties, residence countries have been reluctant
or unable to capture their share of the lost revenues).
287. See TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 626 & n.1526
(2017) (Conf. Rep.).
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the benefits of territoriality. Treaties allow taxpayers to cross
credit income that receives favorable treaty rates with high
taxed income, thereby minimizing the limitation on foreign tax
credits under U.S. law.288 This dynamic will also occur under the
new minimum tax regime, leading to further revenue losses.
To summarize, my data analysis cannot tell us that the
United States is losing revenue from the treaty system, but it
does cast doubt on the assertion that the United States, as a developed country, stands to gain uniformly from tax treaties.
Given the differences in flows between countries and over time,
it is problematic that the United States’ negotiating position remains constant, and it is puzzling that U.S. tax treaties do not
take into account differences in investment flows, disparities in
tax systems, and various ways in which the model treaty may
diverge from the national interest. Despite the enormous economic and legal changes that have developed since the model tax
treaties were first developed, far from becoming more heterogeneous, tax treaties seem to be converging.289 Moreover, despite
the fact that Elisabeth Owens called for formal analysis of the
costs and benefits of tax treaties nearly sixty years ago, there
has been virtually no progress on that front.290 My findings, however, should serve to shift the burden onto treaty proponents to
conduct such analyses.
B. STAGNATION OF DOMESTIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL TAX
NORMS
Another problematic effect of tax treaties is the stagnation
of domestic policy and international tax norms. Over two decades ago, John Avery Jones cited the proliferation of treaties as
problematically locking in both domestic and treaty policy.291

288. See Roin, supra note 77, at 1772–75 (explaining this phenomenon under
the normal foreign tax credit rules).
289. See Elliott Ash & Omri Y. Marian, The Making of International Tax
Law: Empirical Evidence from Natural Language Processing (Jan. 11, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3314310 [https://perma.cc4K69-4K77].
290. Owens, supra note 62, at 452–53; see also Roin, supra note 77, at 1798
(labeling tax treaties tax expenditures and calling for examination of their
costs). I explore possible reasons for these phenomena below. See infra Part IV.A
and accompanying notes.
291. Avery Jones, supra note 1, at 4.
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Tax treaties cannot be easily changed because they are so numerous.292 And, unless countries are willing and able to override
tax treaties, domestic policy is stymied.293 The problem has only
worsened since Avery Jones raised the issue,294 with the number
of treaties having more than doubled since then.
Of course, stagnation may not be a problem if the treaty regime locks in beneficial policy. Although tax treaties may have
initially served some valid purposes,295 they more recently have
contributed to the breakdown of the international tax system. As
discussed above, instead of easing double taxation, treaties have
contributed to double non-taxation.296 This is a direct result of
the architecture set up by the treaty system, relying on the malleable concepts of source and residence, which are the foundations of the domestic international tax systems around the
world.297 This problem has grown exponentially with the rise of
digital technology and immensely valuable (and easily shifted)
intellectual property. Moreover, their requirements have increasingly come into conflict with possible solutions to the problems plaguing the international tax system. Recent U.S. tax reform has brought this problem into the spotlight.
1. The Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax and Potential Treaty
Conflicts
In 2016, Republicans began to set forth their platform to
overhaul the international tax provisions.298 Their initial plan
was to replace the corporate income tax with a destination-based
cash flow tax (DBCFT).299 The DBCFT would have essentially
been a modified VAT, with a deduction for wages.300 Like a VAT,
the tax would also have been border-adjusted, meaning that it
excludes exports and taxes imports without deduction for
292. Id.
293. Unlike the United States, not all countries can override international
agreements through domestic legislation. Kysar, supra note 2, at 36–38.
294. See Avery Jones, supra note 1.
295. See supra Part I.B.
296. See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
298. H. TAX REFORM TASK FORCE, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA 6 (2016), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/ryan_a_better_way_policy_paper_062416.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z7Z
-VP7Y].
299. Id. at 27.
300. Id. at 27–29.
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costs.301 Its features meant that the DBCFT would have treated
debt and equity equally, removed taxes on investment returns,
and eliminated incentives to profit shift and offshore activities.302 Taxing on a destination basis (where sales occur) offers
advantages relative to taxing on an origin basis (where value is
created).303 In general, the residency of customers is more fixed
than that of corporations, and thus taxing a business on this basis likely reduces tax avoidance. Additionally, ascertaining
where products or services are invented is an economic fiction
that has proven impossible to execute, leading to the shifting of
profits through transfer pricing games.304
There are reasons to think that a destination-based approach should at least supplement revenue collection given the
rise of the multinational corporation. However, the plan was critiqued, in part, for its incompatibility with the tax treaty regime
if the DBCFT was considered a “covered tax” under the treaties.305 If so, the treaties’ permanent establishment requirement,
which essentially requires a physical presence in the source
country before that country can exercise taxing jurisdiction over
business profits, would forbid the imposition of a destinationbased tax that taxes where goods are sold.306 In short, the very
feature that makes the DBCFT attractive is the same trait that
makes it incompatible with the treaties—taxing at destination
versus origin.
In addition to the conflict with the permanent establishment
limitation, the DBCFT also implicated other treaty provisions.307
301. Id. at 28.
302. William G. Gale, Understanding the Republicans’ Corporate Tax Reform, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/
understanding-the-republicans-corporate-tax-reform/ [https://perma.cc/ZY67
-WZF8].
303. Id.
304. See generally Alan J. Auerbach & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Role of Border Adjustments in International Taxation, AM. ACTION F., Nov. 2016, at 11–12,
https://www.americanactionforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/The-Role
-of-Border-Adjustments-in-International-Taxation.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE4K
-GY6H] (discussing transfer pricing with differing valuations of imports and exports).
305. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly Clausing, Problems with DestinationBased Corporate Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 229, 246
(2017).
306. Id.
307. Id. (discussing implication of Article 7 (goods and services) and Article
12 (intangibles that produce royalties)).
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In order to include all imports, the DBCFT should be levied on
intangibles that produce royalties and other types of deductible
payments that can substitute for royalties since their exclusion
would invite tax abuse.308 If the DBCFT is considered an income
tax, however, then such inclusion would constitute a treaty override because it would violate the treaty provisions that forbid
withholding on such payments.309 The DCBFT also might arguably violate the nondiscrimination provision of the treaties by
advantaging exporters over importers.310 Furthermore, if the
DBCFT is not an income tax and therefore outside the treaty’s
scope, treaty partners would be under no obligation to provide
foreign tax credits to their residents who pay the tax.311
A further issue results from the fact that U.S. corporations
may no longer be U.S. residents under the treaty because, under
the DBCFT, they would no longer be “liable to tax . . . by reason
of . . . domicile, residence, citizenship, place of management,
place of incorporation, or any other criterion of a similar nature.”312 Accordingly, foreign taxpayers may no longer benefit
from the treaty provision that reduces withholding on dividends,
among other complications.313
Another challenge is that if the United States were to enact
the DBCFT, then its treaty partners may no longer have incentives to maintain or renegotiate treaties.314 This is because the
United States would be giving up its jurisdiction to tax income
as the residence country; therefore, why should a source country
provide relief from its withholding tax? On the other hand, if the
United States was no longer taxing worldwide income, the
308. Id. (“[A]llowing royalties and derivatives to escape the tax on imports
invites abuse (since there will always be lower tax jurisdictions).”).
309. Id.
310. Id.; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption Tax:
Some International Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1329, 1343–46 (1996)
(discussing impact of tax reform on importers and exporters); Reuven S. AviYonah, The International Implications of Tax Reform, 69 TAX NOTES 913, 921–
22 (1995).
311. Shaheen, supra note 88, at 592.
312. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 4.
313. Shaheen, supra note 88.
314. Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 305, at 246; David A. Weisbach, A
Guide to the GOP Tax Plan – The Way to a Better Way, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 171,
214–15 (2017); see also Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1029, 1074–76 (1997) (outlining various possible responses of foreign countries
to the United States tax reform, including pressure to terminate treaties).
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source country’s reduction of withholding tax would flow to the
investor rather than the U.S. Treasury, therefore perhaps
strengthening the source country’s ability to attract investment.315 The source country may also feel increased pressure to
reduce its taxation of direct investment income considering the
favorable tax treatment U.S. investment would receive.316
Another concern would be the potential for tax arbitrage between the DBCFT, which would not tax income, and a treaty
partner’s income tax system that allows for interest deductions.317 This arbitrage opportunity may induce treaty partners
to terminate their treaties in order to impose higher withholding
taxes on interest and dividends to U.S. residents.318 Congress
may attempt to stave off such terminations by imposing its own
withholding tax on interest and dividends to non-residents, but
this may itself violate the nondiscrimination provision since the
United States may not be taxing investment income of its own
residents.319 Even if the provision was upheld, the United States
may wish to condition any treaty exemptions of the new discriminatory tax on reciprocal exemption from the treaty partner, a
perhaps undesirable bargain for a country with reciprocal trade
flows with the United States and a large tax base.320
In short, the enactment of the DBCFT would cause chaos in
the international tax community. The myriad issues presented
by the tax have caused some to predict that its enactment could
lead to the collapse of the treaty regime.321 Moreover, this problem is not specific to the DBCFT. Other significant new taxes in
other countries pose classification challenges for tax treaties. In
the past few years, the Indian Equalization Levy, the UK Diverted Profits Tax, the Australian Diverted Profits Tax, the
Netherlands Excessive Severance Tax, and the Belgian Fairness
Tax are all hybrid taxes of some nature, and serious questions
have arisen over their relationship with the treaty system.322 Together, these taxes and the U.S. reforms, discussed below, are
315. Shay & Summers, supra note 314, at 1075.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1075–76.
320. Id. at 1076.
321. Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 305, at 246–47.
322. Roland Ismer & Christoph Jescheck, The Substantive Scope of Tax
Treaties in a Post-BEPS World: Article 2 OECD MC (Taxes Covered) and the
Rise of New Taxes, in 45 INTERTAX 382, 386–89 (Fred C. De Hosson ed., 2017)
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part of a larger debate over taxing on a destination basis versus
an origin basis.323
More recently, France levied a tax on the digital revenues,
which U.S. technology companies have argued unfairly targets
them.324 Other countries are exploring similar digital taxes.325
The digitalization of the economy poses a significant problem to
international taxation. Since digitalization allows value to be
created without physical presence, countries have increasingly
become frustrated by the treaties’ requirement that physical
presence is required for taxing jurisdiction.326 Nonetheless, a
prior OECD effort to relax the permanent establishment concept
to encompass digital activities failed.327
The new digital services taxes attempt to avoid this constraint by being structured as an equalization levy on a gross
basis.328 Since traditional withholding taxes are also on a gross

(evaluating similarities between new taxes); see also M. Tenore, “Taxes Covered”: The OECD Model (2010) Versus EU Directives, 66 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N
162 (2012).
323. Itai Grinberg, The Future of Corporate Taxation in a Digital World, AM.
ENTER. INST. (Apr. 19, 2018), http://www.aei.org/events/the-future-of-corporate
-taxation-in-a-digital-world/.
324. Hadas Gold, U.S. and France Reach Compromise on Digital Tax, CNN
(Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/26/business/digital-tax-france
-us/index.html [https://perma.cc/8YLD-VEUM] (stating that Amazon said “it
will pass along the costs of the French digital tax to its third-party sellers beginning October 1”).
325. William Horobin & Aoife White, How Europe’s ‘Digital Tax’ Plans Will
Hit U.S. Tech Companies, WASH. POST (July 19, 2018, 7:36 PM), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/business/how-europes-digital-tax-plans-will-hit-us-tech
-companies/2019/07/19/1177baba-aa03-11e9-8733-48c87235f396_story.html
[https://perma.cc/XAQ8-RNRY] (naming the United Kingdom, Austria, Italy,
Spain, and Belgium as countries considering digital taxes).
326. Joe Kennedy, Digital Services Taxes: A Bad Idea Whose Time Should
Never Come, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (May 13, 2019), https://itif
.org/publications/2019/05/13/digital-services-taxes-bad-idea-whose-time-should
-never-come [https://perma.cc/S2XS-8G23] (“[F]rustration stems from the fact
that digitalization has made it possible for companies to export more goods and
services into a country without subjecting themselves to that country’s [corporate income tax].”).
327. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX CHALLENGES
OF DIGITALISATION: COMMENTS RECEIVED ON THE REQUEST FOR INPUT—PART
II, at 6 (2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/tax-challenges-digitalisation-part
-2-comments-on-request-for-input-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8WV-SWT6].
328. See, e.g., Ashok K. Lahiri et al., Equalisation Levy (Brookings Inst. India Ctr., Working Paper No. 01, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
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basis and are still “covered taxes” under the treaties, it is unclear
whether this approach will pass muster. The EU Council Legal
Service issued an opinion that the European Commission’s proposed digital services tax is not an indirect tax,329 which also
makes it harder to contend that tax treaties are not in conflict
with it since tax treaties demand certain requirements of direct
taxes.
Moreover, there is reason to think that the presence of the
treaties affects the design of these equalization taxes to their
detriment. Gross taxes, although sometimes required for administrative purposes, violate ability to pay principles.330 Moreover,
the new equalization taxes have been fairly narrow in application, applying to certain industries and not others, thereby creating efficiency concerns. Arguably, this narrowness stems, in
part, from being hamstrung by the treaty architecture. Without
a multilateral solution to deal with taxation of the digital economy—in fact, the bilateral treaties stand in its way—the proposals have understandably evolved in a piecemeal fashion.
Moreover, justifying these taxes by using the notoriously vague
concept of value creation, which comes from the treaties, problematically sets no reliable guidepost.331 Although the OECD

uploads/2017/01/workingpapertax_march2017_final.pdf (discussing India’s
equalisation levy).
329. Mehreen Khan, EU Lawyers Question Brussels Digital Tax Plan, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/88e0a81a-cbf0-11e8-b276
-b9069bde0956 [https://perma.cc/E7G7-S5QT]. In contrast, Wei Cui argues that
countries should be able to freely design digital taxes so that they fall outside
the scope of the treaty. Cui reasons that a treaty is a contractual agreement and
parties can choose its scope. Cui also argues that, even if double taxation is an
important goal (of which he is skeptical), tax treaties cannot be successful at
this goal if they generate allocations that are in tension with countries’ desires.
Wei Cui, The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense at 20 (Jan. 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1469&context=fac_pubs [https://perma.cc/6B6R-8UBW].
330. See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Fairness in International
Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX
REV. 299, 306–11 (2001) (discussing ability-to-pay principles).
331. Michael Devereux, The Digital Services ‘Sutton’ Tax, SAÏD BUS. SCH.
(Oct. 23, 2018), http://business-taxation.sbsblogs.co.uk/2018/10/23/the-digital
-services-sutton-tax/?dm_i=17AR,5XL76,ELTIXU,N8496,1 [https://perma.cc/
HTM3-6QT2] (“[T]he problem with the DST . . . is that their proponents claim
that the tax has different purposes . . . . [I]t seems likely that the design of any
DST will reflect the obfuscation offered by its advocates as to why it should be
introduced.”).
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countries will likely revisit the definition of “permanent establishment,” it is unclear that stretching this concept to the point
of disbelief will provide any useful parameters for taxing jurisdiction.
We might search for a procedural solution to all of this. If
the DBCFT presents difficulties of treaty interpretation, and
was clearly not contemplated in the treaty’s design, then the
states should endeavor to resolve the issue by mutual agreement. Going forward, a clause could be inserted in Article 2 of
the treaties to cover significant new taxes if the parties reach a
mutual agreement to this effect. The hybrid nature of these taxes
requires further clarification from the treaty partners, and asking courts and arbitrators to fill these significant gaps may be
beyond their institutional capacity. Yet even if an administrative
solution was achievable, the complexities resulting from the
mapping of these taxes onto the treaty system expose the latter’s
rigidity. International movement towards destination-based
taxes or increased taxation at source may be preferable, but this
is antithetical to the fundamental deal cut in tax treaties. As a
result, the substance of the proposals has suffered, and the
treaty regime makes the likelihood of such a shift more remote.
The new recommendations of the OECD/G20 in revising
nexus and profit allocation rules necessitates a dramatic reworking of the tax treaty system. For instance, BEPS 2.0 proposes a
reworking of the permanent establishment concept to allow for
nexus if there is “remote yet sustained and significant involvement in the economy.”332 As an alternative, BEPS 2.0 contemplates a standalone provision that gives market jurisdictions “a
taxing right over the measure of profits allocated to them under
the new profit allocation rules.”333 These proposals would require
a reworking of the arm’s length standard of Article 9 and the
resolution of contentious factors such as the definition of “sustained and significant involvement” or, alternatively, how profits
should be allocated.
2. The BEAT
Although Republicans abandoned the DBCFT, the 2017 tax
legislation that was enacted also poses significant challenges to
the tax treaty system. Among the changes to the tax law is the
new inbound base erosion regime, which is designed to prevent
332. OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK supra note 6, at 22–23.
333. Id.
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earnings stripping from companies that have been able to erode
the base by making deductible payments to related foreign parties.334
The originally proposed inbound regime was the House excise tax.335 The excise tax subjected income from deductible
items, including royalties and cost of goods sold, to an excise tax,
which was designed to prompt taxpayers to elect to treat such
payments as effectively connected income.336 The Ways and
Means committee report made clear that the new tax was necessary to supplement transfer pricing principles, which were insufficient to stop inbound base erosion.337
There is a strong argument that the proposed House excise
tax would have breached treaty obligations because the tax was
designed to hit multinationals without a permanent establishment, in violation of Article 7 of the treaty.338 The excise tax also
was vulnerable to the criticism that it was an indirect way to
impose withholding taxes on royalties, contrary to Article 12 of
the treaties.339 Additionally, the tax also arguably violated the
arm’s length standard of Article 9 of the treaties because it would
have applied to cost of goods sold between the related parties
regardless of what parties dealing at arm’s length would have
agreed to do.340
The end result of the excise tax would have also been to tax
foreign-earned income, with no foreign tax credit or double tax
relief.341 Such criticism forced the House to revise the proposal
to allow a partial foreign tax credit.342 This was the case even
334. See generally U.S. Tax Reform Has a Profound Impact on Inbound Investment, ORRICK (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.orrick.com/ja-JP/Insights/2018/
03/US-Tax-Reform-Has-a-Profound-Impact-on-Inbound-Investment [https://
perma.cc/D9G2-38SE] (explaining inbound investments and lowering of U.S.
corporation tax rate by deductions).
335. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 4303 (2017).
336. Id.
337. H.R. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT, H.R. REP. NO.
115-409, at 400 (2017).
338. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Guilty as Charged: Reflections on TRA 17, 157
TAX NOTES 1131, 1134–35 (2017).
339. Id. at 1135.
340. Id.
341. Id. (“[Trading partners] are likely to retaliate by imposing tax on the
royalties, interest, or cost of goods sold without a credit for the BEMT [base
erosion minimum tax], and that will result in double taxation because there is
no reverse FTC provision in TRA 17S . . . .”).
342. Id.
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though the United States would have been crediting residence
country taxes as the source country, when traditionally foreign
tax credits are offered by the residence country for source country taxes.343 This revision reduced the revenue estimate of the
proposal.344
In part because of its tension with the tax treaties, Congress
abandoned the House excise tax, instead enacting the BEAT, a
new and separate tax.345 The BEAT functions as an alternative
minimum tax, adding back in certain deductible payments to foreign-related parties (but not U.S.-related parties) to constitute a
“modified taxable income” base.346 The BEAT liability is the excess of 10% of that base over the taxpayer’s regular tax liability.
Notably, although it functions like the now repealed corporate
alternative minimum tax, the BEAT does not allow foreign tax
credits in the calculation of the base.347
Importantly, the BEAT also allows parties to circumvent it
because it exempts cost of goods sold, including imbedded royalties.348 In contrast, the House excise tax would have left less
room for circumvention because it would have applied to cost of
goods sold. Unfortunately, because the House tax applied to cost
of goods sold, it likely would have violated the arm’s length principle of the treaties.
Even still, the BEAT as enacted may be in tension with existing tax treaties. The alternative minimum tax structure of the
BEAT is an attempt to accommodate tax treaties, but a group of
EU Ministers asserted that the BEAT regime could be viewed as
discriminating against foreign companies in violation of bilateral
343. Id.
344. The original revenue estimate for the excise tax was $154.5 million over
the budget window period. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT,” SCHEDULED FOR MARKUP BY
THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON NOVEMBER 6, 2017, H.R. REP. NO.
JCX-46-17 (2017), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=
5026 [https://perma.cc/KXE7-NVKK]. This was revised to $94.5 million after revisions to the excise tax, including the provision for foreign tax credits. J. COMM.
ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND
JOBS ACT,” AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
ON NOVEMBER 9, 2017, H.R. REP. NO. JCX-54-17 (2017), https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=5034 [https://perma.cc/QUP2-5GTE].
345. Rosenbloom & Shaheen, supra note 3, at 53.
346. 26 U.S.C. § 59A (2018).
347. The corporate AMT limited foreign tax credits instead of disallowing
them completely. Id.
348. Kysar, supra note 178, at 357.
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tax treaties.349 Article 24(5) of our double tax treaties provides
that treaty partners cannot tax residents of the other treaty
country more heavily than its own residents.350 Arguably, the
BEAT violates this nondiscrimination clause because a foreignowned U.S. entity will be subject to the BEAT regime whereas a
U.S.-owned U.S. entity will not be. One counter-argument is that
the BEAT applies regardless of who ultimately owns the corporation.351 Thus, the BEAT applies to payments from a U.S. entity
to a foreign entity that is owned by the U.S. entity (a CFC),
which indicates that the intent was to protect the U.S. tax base
rather than to discriminate against foreign-owned U.S. parties.352
Another arguable path to treaty violation is Article 24(4),
which commands that foreign residents be entitled to deductions
“under the same conditions” as U.S. residents.353 The BEAT regime, however, is arguably not equivalent to the denial of a deduction, and interest, royalties, and other items remain fully deductible. Instead, the BEAT merely subjects the tax benefit
conferred by such deductions to the 10% tax; denying a tax deduction would increase the tax on the item by 21%, not 10%.354
Additionally, the base erosion rules are perhaps sanctioned un-

349. Stephanie Soong Johnston, EU Finance Ministers Fire Warning Shot
on U.S. Tax Reform, 157 TAX NOTES 1704, 1704 (2017).
350. The model tax treaty provides:
Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of which is wholly or
partly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of the other Contracting State, shall not be subjected in the firstmentioned Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith that is more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which other similar enterprises of the firstmentioned Contracting State are or may be subjected.
U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24(5).
351. Although a harsher result applies to foreign companies that were formerly U.S. companies, such disparate treatment is likely within the savings
clause of the treaties, which allows the United States to tax its residents, and
former residents, under its own domestic law. Id. arts. 1(4), 4(1); see also Bret
Wells, Get with The BEAT, 158 TAX NOTES 1023, 1029 (2018) (arguing the
BEAT is nondiscriminatory).
352. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Beat It: Tax Reform and Tax Treaties (Univ. of
Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No.
587, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096879
[https://perma.cc/9MCL-GSXD].
353. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24(4).
354. Avi-Yonah, supra note 352, at 1026.
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der Article 24(4) because they are necessary to arrive at an appropriate arm’s length result within the meaning of Article 9 of
the treaties, although this argument seems less forceful since the
BEAT applies even when arm’s length prices are charged.355
The BEAT may also violate Article 23, which requires treaty
partners to grant a foreign tax credit for income tax of the treaty
partner “[i]n accordance with the provisions and subject to the
limitations of the law of the United States (as it may be amended
from time to time without changing the general principle
hereof).”356 Since the BEAT offers no foreign tax credit, it may be
inconsistent with the “general principle” of Article 23.357 It is
possible, however, that the BEAT is not a “covered tax” under
Article 2 of the treaty and therefore not subject to the requirements of Article 23 (although still subject to Article 24).358 If the
BEAT did not fall within this category of “covered taxes,” then a
treaty partner could not object to the disallowance of foreign tax
credits.
As discussed above, what constitutes a covered tax is a difficult question, and the status of many new taxes is in doubt.359
Relevant to the BEAT context, however, is that the United
States has previously taken the position that the AMT was covered by the treaties and the two taxes are structurally similar.360
Another counter to the argument that the BEAT falls outside the
treaties’ scope is that Congress chose to enact it as part of subtitle A (income taxes) of the Code.361 In favor of BEAT’s non-coverage, however, is the fact that it denies deductions for payments
to related foreign persons, therefore falling outside the definition
of an “income” tax.362
C. TAX ABUSE OPPORTUNITIES
A third disadvantage of tax treaties is that they encourage
tax avoidance as a result of the ceding of taxing jurisdiction and

355. Wells, supra note 351.
356. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 23.
357. Id.
358. Id. art. 2.
359. See Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 322, at 386–87; supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
360. Rosenbloom & Shaheen, supra note 3, at 54.
361. Id. at 56.
362. Id. at 55.
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the interface between the treaties and domestic provisions.363
Since this was discussed in the context of whether tax treaties
fulfill their promise of achieving double non-taxation, I will not
discuss it here. But it is a significant downside and one that loses
revenue.
IV. WHY DOES U.S. TREATY POLICY REMAIN IN THE
PAST?
If tax treaties have these negative effects and also fail to fulfill their purposes, why has U.S. tax treaty policy remained stagnant for decades? This Part will explore possible answers to this
mystery. It begins with a discussion of how tax treaties suffer
from a deficiency in process. It then explores the lock-in effect
that occurs from having a proliferation of treaties. It then posits
that a race-to-the-bottom dynamic is occurring between some
countries seeking foreign direct investment, thus explaining entrance into the treaties.
A. PROCESS DEFICIENCIES AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
Because tax treaties are Article II treaties, the House is entirely cut out of the tax treaty process despite its long constitutional pedigree as the initiator of tax policy on the domestic
side.364 Somewhat puzzlingly, this stands in contrast to trade
treaties, with which the House has remained involved through
congressional executive agreements.365 The House’s participation in the trade treaty context has been justified, in part, because of its traditional role over revenues, as set forth in the
Origination Clause.366

363. Julie Roin has argued that avoidance as a result of treaty rates is of no
concern because the residual taxation of the residence country offsets the reduction of source country tax. Julie A. Roin, Adding Insult to Injury: The “Enhancement” of § 163(j) and the Tax Treatment of Foreign Investors in the United
States, 49 TAX L. REV. 269, 285 (1994). This view, however, does not take into
account the fact that the residence country may fail to tax the income. Driessen,
supra note 44, at 749 n.22.
364. Kysar, supra note 2, at 23 n.149.
365. JANE M. SMITH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, WHY CERTAIN
TRADE AGREEMENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN TREATIES 2 (2013).
366. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 799, 923 (1995) (noting that the Origination Clause may strengthen the
argument that NAFTA is constitutional); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
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The treaty process often flies under the radar. Most of the
treaty negotiating process happens behind closed doors, with
multinational corporations strategically communicating their
policy positions to negotiators.367 It is not surprising that the
paucity in process benefits special interests like these corporations. Each step in the legislative process can potentially derail
any proposal. The more robust process means the greater potential for policy failure. When the context is bestowing benefits to
special interests, as opposed to the public, a less robust process
will accrue to their benefit.368 Tax treaties reduce the tax bills of
multinational corporations and do not increase taxes. Therefore,
their relatively easy path to enactment favors such constituents
at the expense of the public. Additionally, the resultant lobbying
power of the corporations helps to explain why tax treaties exist
in their current form—to benefit industry. The lack of process
generally benefits policy that would otherwise be controversial
in the legislative process.
Thus, a nefarious explanation for why tax treaties look the
way they do is that they are simply a less visible way to funnel
U.S. revenues to multinational corporations. Seen as tax incentives that do not have the scrutiny of the legislative or budget
processes, they are invisible and against the public interest.369
Perhaps then it is not so puzzling that the United States would
remain in treaties that are antithetical to its interest—to be able
to deliver benefits to powerful constituencies without some kind
of reckoning.
Groups that might normally be opposed to funneling benefits to multinational corporations, such as labor unions, are absent from the tax treaty process, in spite of their engagement
over the reach of our international tax system as implemented
through domestic law.370 Domestic policy disfavoring outbound

Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1261 n.133 (1995) (noting that the Origination Clause may place limits on treaties involving revenues but disagreeing with
Ackerman and Golove that House participation justifies the use of congressional-executive agreements).
367. Driessen, supra note 44, at 745.
368. Kysar, supra note 2, at 35 (noting bicameralism could minimize the influence of special interests by making their preferences more difficult to enact).
369. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 33–39; Zolt, supra note 286, at 10 (noting
greater transparency weighs in favor of a country using domestic legislation
over tax treaties to establish rules for cross-border taxation).
370. Driessen, supra note 44, at 751.
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investment is in direct conflict with the lowering of withholding
rates through the treaty, yet public debate only focuses on the
former. These advocacy groups may overlook tax treaties because the process forecloses open and vigorous deliberation. In
fact, their significant participation in trade treaties suggest this
might be the case since such treaties, as congressional-executive
agreements, are subject to greater process than tax treaties.371
The other major deficiency in process is the lack of revenue
estimates of tax treaties, or any formal studies undertaken by
the U.S. Treasury that might justify entrance into particular tax
treaties.372 The lack of consensus on whether tax treaties increase foreign direct investment and the reversal of trade flows
that the United States has experienced over the past few decades, which almost certainly impacts the revenue picture of the
treaties, makes the omission from the budget process especially
troubling.373
Not only are there no revenue estimates when the United
States enters into treaties, the benefits they funnel to taxpayers
also do not show up on the tax expenditure budget,374 which the
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) publishes to account for revenue losses from special tax benefits. Many decades ago, Stanley
Surrey famously concluded that such preferences should be
highlighted as equivalent to government spending since they
constituted revenue losses.375 Among such preferences Surrey
highlighted were certain tax benefits provided by tax treaties.376
The absence of tax treaties from the tax expenditure budget allows for an easier path to treaty conclusion.377
One might try to justify omission of tax treaties from the tax
expenditure budget as reflecting difficulties in defining the appropriate baseline. Surrey and McDaniel argued, for instance,
371. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1274, 1307–
16 (2008).
372. Driessen, supra note 44, at 749–50.
373. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
374. Steven A. Dean, The Tax Expenditure Budget Is a Zombie Accountant,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 265, 306–07 (2012).
375. Id.
376. PAUL R. MCDANIEL & STANLEY S. SURREY, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
TAX EXPENDITURES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 59 (1985); STANLEY S. SURREY &
PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 168–70 (1985) [hereinafter SURREY &
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES].
377. Dean, supra note 374, at 290 n.117.
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that reduction in gross withholding taxes are not tax expenditures because they reflect an approximation of the tax burden if
it were applied on a net basis.378 If the rate was very low or zero,
as is the case for certain types of income under the treaties, then
such justification for omission from the budget would not be applicable. Another justification for omission might be that the exercise would prove too challenging for the estimators.379 Presumably, however, JCT could attempt to produce average tax rates
applicable to net investment income on the domestic front and
use this as an approximate baseline. A more straightforward alternative, however, is to simply follow the CBO revenue baseline, acknowledging that tax expenditure analysis need not be
precise in detailing costs while still providing the useful function
that such costs exist.
Moreover, this line of argument does not extend to the regular budget process. In estimating revenues for purposes of the
enactment process, if such revenue estimates were produced, the
proper baseline is not a normative one but generally follows current law with some prescribed modifications.380 In that context,
the proper revenue baseline should be the 30% withholding rate
applicable to net investment income earned by non-U.S. residents.381
The paucity in process might also have several other ramifications. As discussed above, treaties do not seem to fulfill their
stated or unstated purposes. Enhanced deliberation might help
clarify the objectives of tax treaties, or expose the lack thereof.382
Additionally, the process problem might also help explain why
tax treaties are surprisingly uniform in nature, a suboptimal result given the variances in relative flows of the U.S. and its tax

378. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 376, at 168.
379. Dean, supra note 374, at 290 n.117
380. David Kamin, Basing Budget Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143,
188–90 (2015); David Kamin & Rebecca Kysar, Temporary Tax Laws and the
Budget Baseline, 157 TAX NOTES 125, 126 (2017).
381. Note, however, that if revenue estimates were undertaken on treaty revisions, then these would often be scored as revenue increases. The relevant
baseline would be the existing treaty, and many recent revisions limit treaty
benefits to address problems of base erosion and profit shifting. Thus, the true
cost of the treaty, on a standalone basis, would not be reflected in the estimates.
It could, however, be captured by the tax expenditure budget, which need not
follow current law.
382. Driessen, supra note 44, at 748. Misstated purposes also risk misleading the judiciary in their interpretation of the treaty.
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treaty partners.383 More robust process might help to create heterogeneity among the treaties, tailoring them to various national
interests.
Finally, although powerful constituencies shape U.S. treaty
policy as a matter of political economy, there is reason to be hopeful that there is some room for reform of the process. Although
tax treaties have historically been approved as a matter of
course, the politically charged environment has made this less
likely.384 Although opponents of tax treaties have blocked them
for reasons unrelated to the problems discussed here,385 perhaps
this controversy will shift the burden to proponents to analyze
and justify their costs.
B. THE LOCK-IN EFFECT
Another obstacle to treaty innovation is the fact that the international tax system is comprised of thousands of bilateral
treaties. Any changes must generally be made treaty-by-treaty.
As discussed above, the proliferation of the treaties has created
a “network effect,” whereby the global community disapproves of
deviations from the script.386 Tax treaties are based on a common
standard that provides more and more benefits the greater the
number of adopters.387 The OECD treaties have positive network
externalities along the dimensions of predictability of legal content, enforcement, and the signaling of a credible commitment to
a stable regime.388 But as the network grows, so do its costs.
First, the initiators can exploit the network to extract “cartelistic gains from potential competitors and monopolistic rents
from its own users.”389 Second, there is a strong lock-in effect;
the treaty remains in force even when the standard becomes undesirable because it becomes difficult for users to establish a new
network. This is because any purveyors of a new standard will
383. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
384. See Ring, supra note 155, at 1198–203.
385. Id.
386. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 170; Dagan, supra note 238, at 1081; see also
Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Structure of the Asymmetric Tax Treaty Network: Theory and Implications 10–11 (Bepress Legal Servs. Working Paper No. 1991,
Feb. 8, 2007), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9408&
context=expresso [https://perma.cc/5FF7-L66T].
387. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 170; Dagan, supra note 238, at 1082.
388. See Baistrocchi, supra note 386, at 32–34 (describing five examples of
positive network externalities of the tax treaty network).
389. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 173.

2020]

UNRAVELING THE TAX TREATY

1823

have a difficult time recruiting other states to join the new network without a critical mass that can reduce risk and transition
costs.390 At one time, the United States and other developed nations may have rationally preferred the treaties’ tilt towards the
residence country when they were capital-exporting, but they
are now locked into that position long after it no longer makes
sense. As a result, the status quo reigns.
C. RACE TO THE BOTTOM
Nations may also enter into tax treaties with countries in
which trade flows are obviously and persistently asymmetrical
in order to receive legitimacy on the international level, although
this is unlikely to be the case with established countries like the
United States. They may hope to increase foreign direct investment through the reduction in tax burden, even though the evidence on this is mixed.391 Countries could be engaging in a race
to the bottom, whereby one country chooses the sub-optimal option of joining the treaty network because it fears others will do
so as well, thereby crowding it out of the investment environment.
In particular, source countries may assent to the regime in
spite of its favoring residence countries because of a prisoner’s
dilemma scenario.392 If all source countries are competing to attract foreign direct investment, they could be in a better position
to agree to not sign treaties and maintain their revenues. Anticipating defection, however, a source country may choose to enter
into a treaty because they may be better off if the other source
country does not sign the treaty, although still worse off than in
a world where the source countries all agreed not to participate
in the treaty regime. They also will be better off than if they are
the fool who did not sign the treaty when the other one did.
Under this scenario, the countries are worse off if all join the
treaty network since there is a perhaps only modest possibility
of increasing investment with a certainty of fewer revenues. Yet,
this is the likely outcome given that a worse outcome would be if
one country joins the treaty network and the other one is left out.
Coordination problems thus may explain why countries with divergent interests enter into tax treaties.393
390.
391.
392.
393.

Id. at 176.
See supra notes 192–200 and accompanying text.
See Baistrocchi, supra note 386, at 11.
But see Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization,
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Finally, the world is changing, and developing countries do
not seem as eager to sign double tax treaties as they once
were.394 As I mentioned above, even developed countries have
started to contemplate self-help regimes around the treaties.395
Consequently, just because tax treaties have evolved as the
building blocks of the international tax regime does not mean
they will continue to serve that function.
V. UNRAVELING THE TAX TREATY
In light of the foregoing discussion, how might we reconceptualize the tax treaty? The world seems to be moving away from
the prioritization of residence country taxation. The recent U.S.
international reform, and proposed and enacted taxes in Europe,
can be seen as strengthening taxation by the “source” country.396
Furthermore, the double tax treaties have recently been under
attack by developing countries, who now question whether it is
in their interest to sign them.397 The pressure that globalization,
stateless income, and technology have placed on the antiquated
international tax system may cause other countries to doubt the
relevance of tax treaties. As a result, the bargains long reached
in the tax treaties may very well be finally upended.
This is because the international tax system, based on artificial concepts of source and residence, is fundamentally at odds
with the nature of today’s world economy. Geopolitical, technological, and economic forces, as well as the phenomenon of stateless income, will require policy innovation that is in tension with
the bargains reached long ago in tax treaties. The allocation of
56 TAX L. REV. 259 (2003) (“Developing countries have benefited from the current bilateral tax treaty practice . . . . They have never been forced, nor have
they claimed to have been forced, into concluding a bilateral treaty with a developed country. In fact, in many cases the developing countries wish to conclude treaties with the developed countries, which often reject their . . . overtures.”).
394. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 181 (“Over the course of the last decade, the
developed countries that were represented by the OECD have been losing some
of their clout as a group.”).
395. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
396. Although destination-based taxes forgo the concept of origin of income,
and hence “source” countries, their practical effect will often be greater source
country taxation.
397. See Martin Henson, When Do Developing Countries Negotiate Away
Their Corporate Tax Base, 30 J. INT’L DEV. 233, 251 (2018) (concluding developing countries should revisit their existing tax treaty networks as their understanding of fiscal costs grows).
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taxing rights no longer makes sense for many countries, both developed and developing, but instead serves small but powerful
constituencies.
The new international tax system will likely contain more
destination-based rules, as a response to the ability of multinational corporations to more easily game origin-based rules. So
far, tax treaties have served to thwart such innovation, but the
desperate need for revenues may eventually require it. Another
possible innovation is to preserve origin-based taxation through
a move to formulary apportionment or global unitary taxation.
The current incarnation of the treaty system is ill-suited to accommodate either type of change. Indeed, the treaty system hits
the United States particularly hard, because, unlike other countries, politics have prevented the United States from adopting
the type of destination-based tax that clearly falls outside the
treaty system—a VAT.
Thus, it seems that we should seriously consider jettisoning,
or at least scaling down, the tax treaty provisions that allocate
taxing jurisdiction. Some of the treaty provisions that do not relate to the allocation of income, however, should be retained, or
at least could be kept with little cost. For instance, any shift to
destination-based taxation is likely to be incremental. As a result, the rules regarding transfer price enforcement will likely be
useful in the interim. The recent shift towards binding arbitration in the treaties makes this treaty function more valuable.
The information exchange provisions are less useful with the rise
of other international agreements in the area and should yield
to those. Their retention does little harm, however, unlike the
allocation of income provisions.
Nondiscrimination is a useful concept in theory but has had
little practical effect. Given the flexible interpretation U.S.
courts have given nondiscrimination, its inclusion in the treaties
does not stand in the way of tax reform. Even if the concept was
strengthened, however, it would provide normatively appealing
constraints on tax reform.
Other functions, like the avoidance of double taxation, are
somewhat incoherent, likely unnecessary due to domestic law
provisions, and could also be refined. Revisiting the chart from
above, we can summarize which features of the treaty should be
maintained and which should be abandoned or altered, as follows:
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Outcome

1.

Residency Rules,
Including
Limitation on
Benefits

Articles 4,
22

Neutral/
Helpful

Maintain, Although
Less Necessary
Without Jurisdictional Provisions

2.

Permanent
Establishment
Requirement
(Jurisdictional
Provision)

Articles 5,
7

Harmful

Abandon or Scale
Down

3.

Limit Source
Country Withholding Tax on Investment Income
(Jurisdictional
Provision)

Articles
10–13

Harmful

Abandon or Scale
Down

4.

Alleviation of
Double Tax
Requirements

Article 23

Neutral/
Perhaps
Unnecessary

Maintain, with
Refinement

5.

Non-Discrimination Provisions

Article 24

Helpful

Maintain, with
Clarification

6.

Transfer Pricing/
Dispute Resolution

Article 25

Helpful

Maintain, with
Focus on Binding
Arbitration

7.

Information
Exchange
Provisions

Article 26

Neutral/
Helpful

Maintain, Although
Perhaps Unnecessary Due to Other
Agreements

As discussed above, the OECD has completed a multinational instrument that aims to create a streamlined mechanism
by which countries can amend their existing tax treaties to include BEPS measures, subject to domestic ratification procedures.398 The aim is to allow countries to update their treaties
without the need for treaty-by-treaty negotiating. This effort is,

398. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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in some ways, not as ambitious as it first appears. It primarily
relates to proposals, like the limitation on benefits and mandatory arbitration provisions, that can be found in existing treaties
entered into by the United States. In general, the BEPS process
leaves in place treaty rules dividing the tax base between the
two countries and does little to update those concepts. Treaties
are also only amended if there is a two-sided “match” between
treaty partners in choosing which of the new provisions to adopt.
Still, one could imagine that the multilateral instrument may
eventually extend beyond the BEPS project, inducing the United
States to sign on to it.399 Somewhat paradoxically, the multilateral instrument, which was designed to breathe new life into the
double tax treaty regime, could be used to scale it down. Specifically, the multilateral instrument could be used to opt out of
those aspects of the tax treaties that reallocate taxing jurisdiction while maintaining the still useful features such as dispute
resolution mechanisms and nondiscrimination provisions. This
would allow countries to examine where it is in their interest to
give up source-based taxation and where it is not. Essentially,
rather than countries signing on to a system of treaties that are
identical to one another, the multilateral instrument could be
used to tailor treaties to the particular needs of a set of countries,
creating a heterogeneous international tax system.400
This new heterogeneity of the tax treaties, although disruptive in many respects, could more fairly reflect the incongruity
of trade flows between countries, differences in the elasticities of
taxing foreign income between nations, variances in revenue
needs, and divergence in gains from comity and reputation. Although this diversification could occur unilaterally, the multilateral instrument provides a mechanism to do so without jettisoning the treaty framework altogether or taking the controversial
move of treaty termination. It would also obviate the need for
painstaking treaty-by-treaty negotiation, although this would
certainly still be a possibility. Moreover, it provides a mechanism
399. Yariv Brauner, for instance, has argued that it is difficult to imagine
that the multilateral instrument will be abandoned after the BEPS treaty
norms have been implemented. Brauner, supra note 90, at 1030.
400. This prescription is similar to that suggested by Victor Thuronyi with
regard to developing nations signing “skinny treaties” that do not yield taxing
rights, although my recommendation is broader than his since it applies to developed nations as well. See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Treaties and Developing
Countries, in TAX TREATIES: BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMICS 441, 445 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2010).
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to automatically update treaties as the circumstances of a nation
change.
Leveraging the multilateral instrument would also allow for
intermediate options that a nation could opt into. Instead of
abandoning the low treaty rates on withholding, for instance,
they could be raised somewhat in between the current treaty
rates and the statutory rates. Nations could even specify a range
that they would tolerate, and if the treaty partner’s range also
matches, then the treaty rates could be adjusted to the mid-point
of overlap.
Another more moderate option would be to expand upon the
permanent establishment concept, allowing for taxation at
source without a physical presence as is contemplated as a possibility in BEPS 2.0.401 This would provide much-needed certainty of legality for the incremental taxes that have thus far
been implemented in various countries. Reforming the concept
of permanent establishment could also make source country jurisdiction contingent upon administrative capacity of the source
country.402 Since a country without the ability to collect source
country taxes is arguably not losing anything from residence
country taxation, treaty partners may decide this is an efficient
allocation of taxing jurisdiction.
An important aspect of this approach is flexibility. Currently, the multilateral instrument goes a long way in this regard by allowing countries to opt in and out of proposals. Even
the minimum standards, which signatories to the instrument
are required to meet, can be fulfilled in a variety of manners.
Since the multilateral instrument allows nations to pick and
choose which treaties are subject to which new provisions, this
would allow countries with asymmetric trade flows or different
tax systems to opt out of the tax allocation provisions when it is
not in their interest. One treaty partner’s opting out, however,
will likely negatively impact the other from a revenue standpoint. Once the other country sees that withdrawal is imminent,
however, it may be in their interest to acquiesce to the unilateral
withdrawal rather than risk the termination of the entire treaty.
The countries may also decide to come to an agreement to scale
up source-based taxation. Moreover, the multilateral instrument
could provide a means to revisit the treaties if a country’s economic circumstances changed.
401. OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 6.
402. Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 170.
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Rather than the 3000 tax treaties that are nearly identical
to one another, we could have a system of bilateral tax treaties
that are better calibrated to national interests. Moreover, by
deemphasizing residence-based jurisdiction, this type of system
may help to solve the stateless income problem. Finally, because
the pared down treaty system would necessarily give way to
more domestic solutions, international tax could respond more
readily to current economic conditions and tax planning maneuvers. Although some might critique this solution as causing
chaos in the international tax sphere, I would argue that we are
at least on the precipice of that point already, and an ordered
unwinding of the system is preferable to unilateral moves by individual nations that we are beginning to see.
Another advantage of this proposal is that it would give nations the space and flexibility to experiment with new ways to
tax cross-border income. As countries have struggled with various methods of taxing stateless income it has become apparent
that fitting such new taxes into the old tax treaty model is a fool’s
errand. Moreover, the time to explore novel approaches to crossborder taxation is now, as the E.U. state aid controversy and
other developments have suddenly cast doubt upon the
longstanding status quo of preventing double taxation as the sole
focus of the international tax system.403
If tax treaties are at least partially unraveled, we might ask
how and when the new system should be rebuilt. It is my view
that even if true multilateral coordination of the tax base is not
achieved, abandonment of or scaling down aspects of the current
bilateral system is still worthwhile given their harmful effects.
Ideally, however, a new system could be put into place as the
older treaties are being unraveled. The best solution would be
for nations to come together to decide on new principles that can
accommodate our changing world.404 This could, for instance,

403. See Steven A. Dean, A Constitutional Moment for Cross-Border Taxation (Jan. 30, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (likening the
current political environment in cross-border taxation to a potentially transformative constitutional moment).
404. Optimistically, the BEPS 2.0 efforts are indicia that such coordinated
innovation is beginning to occur. OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 6,
at 22–23. Although a consensus has not yet been reached, the OECD/G20 has
begun to seriously consider the expansion of market jurisdiction taxing rights,
a minimum tax regime, and inbound base erosion rules. Public Consultation
Document: Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” Under Pillar One,
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 4 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/
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mean engaging in a true substantive multilateral treaty in order
to design profit allocation rules. Such principles must extend beyond the EU’s current sectorial focus of digital taxation and the
geographic focus on large U.S. corporations. Multilateral solutions should also strengthen source-based taxation in instances
where the residence country is not taxing the income. To the extent an initial allocation of taxing jurisdiction is retained, the
multilateral instrument could, for instance, pursue provisions
that “throw-back” the tax to a state if the state of initial apportionment does not tax the item.405
More modestly, the multilateral instrument could be used to
resolve problems of inconsistent tax treatment. For instance,
countries could agree to harmonize their tax rules in certain areas or to make adjustments to their domestic rules in order to
achieve consistent tax treatment.406 It could also be used to refine source rules to incorporate more destination-based concepts
such as customer base.407 Domestic double-tax relief systems
could then function in a better manner. Likewise, other problems

beps/public-consultation-document-secretariat-proposal-unified-approach
-pillar-one.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9G6-8Z57]; Public Consultation Document:
Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“Globe”)—Pillar Two, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 5 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public
-consultation-document-global-anti-base-erosion-proposal-pillar-two.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RYW-J67N].
405. Wells & Lowell, supra note 20, at 38 n.181. Such a system would replicate the “throw-back rules” adopted by several states in the United States. See
Walter Hellerstein, The Quest for ‘Full Accountability’ of Corporate Income, 63
ST. TAX NOTES 627 (2011).
406. See Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral
Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1641, 1652 (2001). Some multilateral proposals
seek to simply replicate the OECD bilateral model treaty on a multilateral basis. See Michael Lang et al., Draft for a Multilateral Treaty, in MULTILATERAL
TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW (Michael
Lang et al. eds., 1998). Tsilly Dagan has also argued for greater coherence in
harmonizing the international tax system through focus on such rules, although
not through a treaty or instrument per se. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 311–12.
Harmonization of tax rules has been done on a small, although not legally binding, scale. See Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes
to Foreign Public Officials, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Apr. 11,
1996) (representing a political commitment by OECD countries to deny a deduction for bribes).
407. See Paul Oosterhuis & Amanda Parsons, Destination-Based Income
Taxation: Neither Principled nor Practical?, 71 TAX L. REV. 515, 515–23 (2017).
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of cross-border arbitrage could be addressed by the multilateral
instrument.408
If multilateral solutions are not found, domestic law could
step in to serve as a coordination device. For instance, domestic
law could impart some of the give and take in foreign relations
by premising code provisions on reciprocity. This would allow nations to have more control over their revenue policy while also
partially tying tax systems together. This would also address one
potential objection to ceding more authority to individual nations—that control over international relations would be lost because nations would no longer have the quid pro quo negotiation
that the treaty system imparts.
It would also remove some of the arbitrariness in applying
different policies to treaty and nontreaty countries, even if the
economics or politics of the situation call for uniform treatment
between the two. A reciprocal code provision would instead tie
foreign relations policy to the desired criteria. For instance, a
code provision could reallocate profits from a foreign related
party to a domestic-related party if the foreign profits were not
subject to meaningful taxation abroad. This would be similar to
the new kill-switch provisions in the 2016 U.S. Model Treaty but
would have the advantages that unilateral decision-making
brings.409 After all, precisely those countries that are reluctant
to tax such income may also be reluctant to implement these new
treaty provisions. Other destination-based statutory solutions,
like destination-based taxes or experimental source rules, could
also be utilized to preserve taxation of business income.410 As
these rules are enacted by a powerful country like the United
States, other nations may follow suit, creating harmonization
without multilateral action.
Another significant advantage domestic law has over treaties is, at least in the United States, greater democratic process
and transparency. With regard to statutory changes, both
houses of Congress are involved, there is greater opportunity for
408. On a more ambitious level, proponents of formulary apportionment may
wish to use the multilateral instrument to shift to such a system.
409. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, arts. 11, para. (2)(c), 12, para.
(2)(a), & 21, para. (2)(a).
410. Such solutions need not wholly embrace destination-based taxation but
could instead utilize some of its principles alongside the existing system. This
incremental approach would allow for experimentation with a new form of taxation on a platform less risky than, say, the destination-based cash flow tax that
would have replaced the corporate income tax.
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deliberation, and any changes would be subject to the normal
budget process.411 This has the advantage of bringing scrutiny
over policies that benefit multinational corporations at perhaps
great cost to the fisc. Although one can make the case that tax
treaties allow countries to strategically enact different tax systems for foreign and domestic investors,412 such differentiation
would still be attainable in, and would benefit from, a robust legislative process. Such a solution would also lend itself to greater
policy innovation and fiscal flexibility.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, this Article finds fault with the traditional justifications offered in favor of bilateral tax treaties. Most criticism
towards these treaties has been done on behalf of developing nations, but countries like the United States also stand to lose from
the status quo. Rather than accommodating tax reform or reflecting differences in tax systems or trade flows, the treaties, by
and large, are entrenched and follow a single model. At a minimum, formal revenue and economic analyses of double income
tax treaties should be undertaken to explore whether the treaties are in the interest of the United States. Further, this Article
argues that the most damaging aspects of the tax treaties are
those provisions that allocate taxing jurisdiction. Countries
should abandon or scale back these provisions, leveraging the
new multilateral instrument as a possible means to do so. The
hope is that this process paves the way toward a more dynamic
and heterogenous tax treaty and the rebuilding of a more rational international tax system. Gone are the days where nations
are able to invoke some notion of economic neutrality to justify a
uniform international tax system. Instead, the system must do
its best to coordinate within a world of competing national interests.

411. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 33.
412. See Zolt, supra note 286, at 14.
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APPENDIX
A. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS DATA 2003–2017
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)413

Country
Belgium

Net Lending (+) or
Net Borrowing (-)
from Current,
Capital, & Financial
Account Transactions

Net Lending (+) or Net
Borrowing (-) from
Financial Account
Transactions

921,88

170,508

-669,771

-509,618

-1,508,415

-616,350

Italy

-311,887

-2259

Luxembourg

-126,115

-149,878

Netherlands

1,273,415

300,870

United Kingdom

-651,997

-863,954

Canada

-284,902

-226,364

Mexico

-943,492

82,432

Venezuela

-212,379

25,799

Australia

785,465

305,549

-5,745,479

-1,435,305

-344,510

-26,552

-2,009,670

-759,504

-366,308

-199,994

-4448

-612

-11,028,305

-3,905,232

France
Germany

China
India
Japan
Republic of Korea
South Africa
Total

413. See Table 1.3. U.S. International Transactions, BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS: INTERACTIVE DATA, https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=
62&step=1 (follow “International Transactions (ITA)”; then follow “Table 1.3.
U.S. International Transactions, Expanded Detail by Area and Country”).
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B. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY ANNUAL SURVEY OF
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS, 2003–2017(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)414
Second, I studied the U.S. Department of Treasury Annual
Survey of Portfolio Holdings, which consists of stock data at particular points in a given year since 2003. The Annual Survey lists
both the value of foreign holdings of U.S. securities and the value
of U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign securities. Of the sixty-six
countries listed on the IRS website, two countries did not have
sufficient security holdings to list. The rest were examined. Notably, the Treasury data revealed the U.S. had inflows of capital
greater than outflows with respect to the tax treaty countries in
every year in which data was collected except one (2006). From
2003 to 2017, the net flows were negative by $22.14 trillion or an
average of $1.476 trillion per year.

Year

Tax Treaty Country
Holdings of U.S.
Securities at End of
June of Year
Shown

Market Value of
U.S. Holdings of
Tax Treaty Country
Securities at End of
the Year Shown

Net Flows

2017

13,462,660

12,408,946

-1,053,714

2016

12,580,491

9,891,264

-2,689,227

2015

12,563,446

9,454,779

-3,108,667

2014

12,080,917

9,604,305

-2,476,612

2013

10,564,471

9,130,409

-1,434,062

2012

9,659,592

7,958,388

-1,701,204

2011

9,212,767

6,840,849

-2,371,918

2010

7,893,465

6,763,362

-1,130,103

2009

7,167,285

5,976,711

-1,190,574

2008

7,646,906

4,291,407

-3,355,499

414. See Foreign Holdings of U.S. Securities at the End of the Period Shown,
DEPT. OF THE TREASURY/FED. RESERVE BD.: TREASURY INT’L CAPITAL SYS. (Apr.
30, 2019), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/
Pages/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/H56D-ZZJ9]; Market Value of U.S. Holdings
of Foreign Securities at the End of the Year Shown, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY/FED. RESERVE BD.: TREASURY INT’L CAPITAL SYS. (Oct. 31, 2019), https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/index.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q3DD-EEYG].
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2007

7,307,148

7,219,707

-87,441

2006

5,842,935

5,990,896

147,961

2005

5,164,573

4,609,105

-555,468

2004

4,505,334

3,786,635

-718,699

2003

3,571,856

3,152,282

-419,574

Total Net Flows

-22,144,801

Average Net Flows Per Year

-1,476,320

C. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY DATA BY COUNTRY, 2017
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)415

Countries and
Regions

Value of
Foreign Holdings of U.S. Securities as of
June 20, 2017

Value of U.S
Portfolio
Holdings of
Foreign
Securities as of
Dec. 31, 2017

Net Flows

622

284

-338

270,762

354,873

84,111

19,934

32,061

12,127

7,361

1,629

-5732

Armenia (11)
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan (11)
Bangladesh

1,005

924

-81

23,793

2,352

-21,441

Belarus (11)

151

1,012

861

Belgium and Luxembourg (5)

NA

NA

NA

690,855

72,481

-618,374

Barbados

Belgium (5)
Bulgaria

169

202

33

Canada

1,060,832

995,893

-64,939

China (21)

1,540,549

162,282

-1,378.267

Cyprus
Czech Republic (10)
Denmark

620

2,115

1495

23,507

4,764

-18,743

124,571

110,150

-14,421

415. See Foreign Holdings of U.S. Securities at the End of the Period Shown,
supra note 414; Market Value of U.S. Holdings of Foreign Securities at the End
of the Year Shown, supra note 414.
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Egypt
Estonia (11)
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8,548

8,093

-455

457

214

-243

Finland

45,098

47,152

2054

France

291,810

604,774

312,964

Georgia (11)

74

953

879

427,172

494,275

67,103

Greece

3,935

9,988

6053

Hungary

2,557

12,632

10,075

Iceland

3,395

2,600

-795

133,423

194,444

61,021

Germany

India
Indonesia
Ireland

33,974

73,228

39,254

1,068,048

495,403

-572,645

Israel

87,640

66,211

-21,429

Italy

78,187

140,214

62,027

976

1,059

83

1,998,329

1,132,251

-866,078

28,523

5,688

-22,835

281,754

263,113

-18,641

Jamaica
Japan
Kazakhstan (11)
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan (11)
Latvia (11)
Lithuania (11)

NA

0

NA

2,095

219

-1876

281

1,444

1163

1,397,779

145,873

-1,251,906

Malta

1,499

1,260

-239

Mexico

97,115

162,693

65,578

Morocco

1,811

0

-1811

Mozambique

355

2,249

1894

Netherlands

397,974

537,731

139,757

NA

NA

NA

Luxembourg (5)

Netherlands Antilles (22)
New Zealand

26,582

20,468

-6114

340,323

71,188

-269,135

3,830

3,430

-400

Philippines

42,703

27,545

-15,158

Poland

36,035

26,669

-9366

8,358

14,924

6566

Norway
Pakistan

Portugal
Romania
Russia (11)

3,374

4,196

822

103,403

69,191

-34.212
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314

386

72

Slovenia (6)

2,176

1,706

-470

South Africa

22,393

115,362

92,969

Spain

59,953

158,215

98,262

Sri Lanka

1,039

4,461

3422

Sweden

180,244

172,330

-7914

Switzerland

823,897

505,951

-317,946

Tajikistan (11)
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago

1

47

46

79,193

51,056

-28,137

9,748

677

-9071

Tunisia

1,089

1,842

753

Turkey

59,367

39,814

-19,553

2,270

8,978

6708

1,493,215

1,473,490

-19,725

Turkmenistan (11)
Ukraine (11)
United Kingdom
Uzbekistan (11)
Venezuela
Total

0

4

0

-4

5,609

3,014

-2595

13,462,660

8,919,723

-4,542,937

